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I COMMENTS I
An 'Atypical and Significant' Barrier to
Prisoners' Procedural Due Process Claims
Based on State-Created Liberty Interests
I see the Due Process Clause itself not Hawaii's prison code as
the wellspring of the protection due Conner'
I. Introduction
Despite the reality that "prisoners as a class are a despised and
politically powerless minority, ' prisoners and their advocates have
fought to convince the judiciary that inmates retain their Constitu-
tional rights even after incarceration.' As courts acknowledged
prisoners' rights in the late 1960s and early 1970s, positive changes
gradually occurred in prison administration which afforded inmates
greater Constitutional protections.4 Once inmates learned that
1. Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2303 (1995)(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
2. Susan N. Herman, The New Liberty: The Procedural Due Process Rights of Prisoners
and Others Under the Burger Court, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 482, 527 (1984).
3. See generally JAMES J. GOBERT & NEIL P. COHEN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS (1981);
MICHAEL MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS (1993). According to Mushlin, "[t]he
Constitution did not breach prison walls for over 170 years." Id. at § 102.
4. See generally Eugene N. Barkin, The Emergence of Correctional Law and the
Awareness of the Rights of the Convicted, in THE TASKS OF PENOLOGY, 103-23 (1969);
Charles H. Jones, Jr. & Edward Rhine, Due Process and Prison Disciplinary Practice: From
Wolff to Hewitt, 11 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 44 (1985); Members of
the Law Review Staff, Behind Closed Doors: An Empirical Inquiry into the Nature of Prison
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their rights were not extinguished by imprisonment, the federal
court dockets grew with claims challenging the conditions of
confinement.5 Within twenty-five years, prisoner litigation had
become a subdivision of the federal case docket demanding
considerable attention.6
As the inmate population continues to increase,7 prison
administrators are forced to grope for ways to control their
overcrowded facilities. High crime rates also persist, forcing
taxpayers to fund a vast prison system.' Outraged by the astro-
nomical number of claims originating from overcrowded and
violent prisons, many legislators are currently calling for eradication
of lawsuits brought by "jail-house lawyers."9 Bitter tension exists
between inmates and outsiders over the abundance of lawsuits
challenging prison conditions.
Persuasive arguments, proffered by both sides, intensify the
battle over prisoner litigation. Advocates contend that while
prisoners are rightfully incarcerated for punishment, 10 the equally
Discipline in Georgia, 8 GA. L. REV. 919,924 n.31 (1974) [hereinafter Behind Closed Doors].
5. DAVID RUDOVSKY ET AL., THE RIGHTS OF PRISONERS: THE BASIC ACLU GUIDE
To A PRISONER'S RIGHTS, xvi (ACLU, 4th ed. 1988).
6. Judge Doumar of the Eastern District of Virginia suggests that prisoner cases have
"led to the creation of an entire subsection of the judiciary." Robert G. Doumar, Prisoner
Cases: Feeding the Monster in the Judicial Closet, 14 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 21, 21
(1994).
7. As of June 30, 1994, the total population of state and federal prisons combined was
1,012,851. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTIC, Press Release (Oct. 30, 1994). The United States incarcerates more people per
capita than any other country. RUDOVSKY, supra note 5, at xii.
8. Criminal justice services are funded predominantly by the taxes raised in the
jurisdiction where the services are performed. See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, Bureau of
JUSTICE STATISTICS REPORT TO THE NATION ON CRIME AND JUSTICE, (1983); RAMSEY
CLARK, CRIME IN AMERICA (1970).
9. Inmate lawsuits are frequently criticized by the public. For example, see Editorial,
Frivolous Lawsuits: Reining in 'Jailhouse Lawyers', CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, July 3, 1995, at
A12; Editorial, Frivolous Jailhouse Suits Clog System, CAPITAL-GAZETrE COMMUNICATIONS,
INC., Aug. 2, 1995, at Al. Congress has introduced in the House of Representatives a Bill
entitled "State Correctional Litigation Reform Act of 1995" in an attempt to limit inmate
claims. H.R. 322, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). But see James Heavey, Punishing Prisoners
Too Much, THE SAN FRAN. EXAMINER, July, 25,1995, at A12 (criticizing as unconstitutional
a House proposal better known as "Stopping Turning Out Prisoners Act (STOP)" which
purports to end abuses by federal judges ruling on prisoner lawsuits by placing prison
officials beyond judicial scrutiny).
10. Retribution, restraint, isolation, deterrence and rehabilitation have been the major
goals of the correctional system. Modern penology focuses primarily on punishment and
rehabilitation but commentators suggest these two goals frequently work against each other.
This is especially true when prisoners seek procedural protections in the context of
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important goal of rehabilitation necessarily fails unless prisoners are
treated fairly within the system. Of critical importance are inner-
prison disciplinary hearings which allow inmates wrongly accused
of misconduct to defend themselves against further punishment.
Opponents denounce the waste of judicial resources expended on
prisoner claims instituted to challenge basic prison management11
or as an assertion of defiance." Given the relentless growth of
the prison population and the nation's current resentment of
litigious inmates, the ultimate clash of these two forces was
inevitable.
In June 1995, the United States Supreme Court reexamined
the circumstances under which states can create "liberty interests"
in the prison context which will be protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.13 In Sandin v. Conner,14 the Court reduced prison-
ers' claims by erecting a legal barrier designed to deter use of the
Fourteenth Amendment as a basis upon which to challenge prison
conditions.'5 Under the Sandin holding, states may create liberty
interests by statutes or prison regulations only when the restraint
disciplinary proceedings for misconduct. See generally Bruce R. Jacobs & K. M. Sharma,
Disciplinary and Punitive Transfer Decisions and Due Process Values in the American
Correctional System, 12 STETSON L. REV. 2 (1982) (noting that the "dual mandate of
corrections-treatment and punishment-is to a large extent contradictory in that the 'primacy
of one has negative implications for the other"'); Sen. Roman Hruska, Preface, in THE TASKS
OF PENOLOGY: A SYMPOSIUM ON PRISONS AND CORRECTIONAL LAW v (Harvey S. Perlman
and Thomas B. Allingloneds eds., 1969) (documenting that a perpetual dilemma, labelled "an
uneasy and irrational equilibrium," exists between rehabilitation and punishment as the two
dominant theories underlying the system of incarceration).
11. Frivolous prisoner lawsuits represent a severe problem for the federal courts. See
generally Doumar, supra note 6, at 24 (providing statistics on the number of inmate claims
filed in federal courts between 1967 and 1993 and predicting that "[i]f this trend continues,
the United States District Courts will become prisoner and criminal courts [and] there will
be no room for non-prisoner civil cases"). See also Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1972)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (recognizing that prisoners have little to lose by bringing greater
rather fewer suits); Nasim v. Warden, 64 F.3d 951, 953 n.1 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting that
prisoner litigation constitutes nearly 75% of the in forma pauperis cases filed in the Fourth
Circuit). Many citizens resent the waste of judicial resources necessary to weed out frivolous
prisoner claims. See e.g. Frivolous Lawsuits: Reining in the Jadhouse Lawyer, supra note 9,
at A12 (opining that one Ohio inmate currently has over 100 suits and appeals pending).
12. See Evans v. Croom,.650 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1153 (1982)
(recognizing that prisoner litigation is often "a mere outlet for general discontent" or for
"personal satisfaction in attempting to harass guards").
13. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2295. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
forbids the states to "deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of
law... " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
14. 115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995).
15. Id. at 2300; see discussion infra part IV.
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
to be imposed for a disciplinary infraction will cause the inmate
"atypical and significant hardship ... in relation to the ordinary
incidents of prison life."'
6
By establishing a new analysis for prisoners' procedural due
process claims, Sandin promises to impact the entire spectrum of
prisoners' rights litigation. First, in attempting to circumvent
frivolous prisoner claims, 7 the Sandin Majority actually expands
upon controlling precedent by returning to an analysis focused on
the type of deprivation as opposed to the origin of the threatened
liberty interest.18 Second, the Majority opinion in Sandin further
confuses Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence by failing to clarify
how a deprivation can be at once "atypical" and still not indepen-
dently trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause.19 This
comment will examine the implications of the Sandin decision as it
relates to prisoners' procedural due process rights in the context of
inner-prison disciplinary proceedings. As a starting point, Part II
provides a brief overview of the history of prisoners' rights. Part
III traces the concept of state-created liberty interests, noting
problems with the "positivist '  approach that focused heavily on
the language of statutes and regulations. Significant cases defining
the positivist approach to liberty interests in the prison context are
also explored. Part IV presents a detailed look at the Sandin
decision itself. Finally, part V explores whether Sandin's approach
to prisoners' procedural due process claims offers an effective
method for balancing prisoners' Fourteenth Amendment rights with
16. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2300.
17. Prior to Sandin, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)(1994) was the only screening device for
prisoner cases filed in forma pauperis. In forma pauperis allows an indigent litigant to
proceed without incurring costs, but § 1915(d) authorizes a district court to dismiss a case
before service if "satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious." 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(d).
"Section 1915(d) effectively appoints the district court as the gatekeeper ... armed with
meaningful discretion to exclude those cases which it is satisfied are frivolous." Nasim v.
Warden, 64 F.3d 951, 953 (4th Cir. 1995). Section 1915(d), however, has been largely
ineffective in stemming the tide of inmate complaints. Id.
18. See generally Martin A. Schwartz, Restrictions on Prisoners' Liberty Interests, N.Y.
L.J., Aug. 15, 1995 at 3.
19. See Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2303 n.2 (Ginsburg, J. and Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting
that since the majority opinion fails to clarify the definition of "atypical," prisoners, lawyers,
and the lower courts are "left at sea" to determine what constitutes such a deprivation).
20. "Positivist" law is law grounded in state, federal or local law, as created by the acts
and practices of legislators and administrators. BLACK'S LAW DICriONARY 1162 (6th ed.
1990). Positive law is differentiated from the "natural" law principles embodied in the
Constitution. See Herman, supra note 2, at 483. See also discussion infra part III.A.
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the goals of imprisonment. In addition, this part examines how the
Sandin decision reflects a national outcry against prisoner litigation.
II. A Brief Evolution of Prisoners' Rights
A. A General Overview: Basic Rights
The journey towards increased recognition of prisoners' rights
has been fraught with controversy. Prisoners were initially viewed
as "slaves of the state,"21 rightfully deprived of their liberty and
property as punishment for breaking the law. The public shunned
prisons, unaware and disinterested in the conditions of life behind
bars.22 At the same time, the federal judiciary created and
enforced what became known as the "hands-off" doctrine.' This
doctrine epitomized the judiciary's extreme reluctance to interfere
with prison administration. In practice, the doctrine ensured that
correctional officers were virtually insulated from judicial review
and were rarely held accountable for their treatment of inmates.
Since prison officials retained absolute discretion over inner-prison
21. Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790 (1871), established the early view
that prisoners must be governed by the state as punishment for breaking the law.
The Bill of Rights is a declaration of general principles to govern a society
of freemen and not of convicted felons and men civilly dead. Such men have
rights, it is true, such as the law in its benignity accords to them, but not the rights
of freemen. They are slaves of the state undergoing punishment for heinous
crimes committed against the laws of the land.
Id. Proponents cited the Thirteenth Amendment as support. The Thirteenth Amendment
states, "[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as punishment for crime, whereof
the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIII, § 1. The judiciary eventually discredited this theory. Critics argue, however,
that recent Supreme Court opinions do little other than relegate inmates back to their
historical position as slaves. See Eugenie Claire Gavenchak, Procedural Due Process in
Prisoners' Rights: The State Giveth and the State Taketh Away, 57 B.U. L. REV. 387, 395
(1977); See also discussion infra part III.B.b.
22. See e.g., RUDOVSKY, supra note 5, at xii. Prisons still remain somewhat isolated
from public scrutiny. Public attention is typically only drawn when prisoner litigation
exposes horrific conditions or when information regarding the number and content of
frivolous claims is published. Id.
23. The "hands-off" doctrine has been harshly criticized. For example, state and federal
courts content to adopt the "hands-off" approach, "leav[e] inmates in a state of de facto
rightlessness and giv[e] prison officials a breadth of discretion tantamount to absolute
power." Behind Closed Doors, supra note 4, at 920. See also Mark Berger, Withdrawal of
Rights and Due Deference: The New Hands Off Policy in Correctional Litigation, 47
U.M.K.C. L. REV. 1 (1978); Jones, Jr. & Rhine, supra note 4, at xii.
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disciplinary proceedings, prisoners' basic procedural due process
rights were frequently arbitrarily denied.24
In support of its refusal to intervene in the administration of
state prisons, the federal judiciary offered many rationales. Courts
cited: (1) a separation of powers theory which defined prison
administration as an executive rather than a judicial function;25 (2)
a federalism theory which allowed federal courts to refuse jurisdic-
tion over state prisoners' claims;26 (3) a "lack of expertise" theory
under which both federal and state courts refrained from handling
any matter uniquely tied to daily prison administration;27 and, (4)
24. Critics of the American penal system often conclude that the unchecked discretion
of prison guards contributes significantly to incarceration's dehumanizing aspect. Blanket
discretion in turn sparks inmate violence, distrust, and misconduct.
Prisoners often have their privileges revoked, are denied the right of access to
counsel, sit in solitary or maximum security or lose 'good time' on the basis of a
single, unreviewed report of a guard. When the courts defer to administrative
discretion, it is to this guard to whom they delegate the final word on reasonable
prison practices. This is the central evil in prison... the unreviewed administra-
tive discretion granted to the poorly trained personnel who deal directly with
prisoners.
Hirschkop & Millemann, The Unconstitutionality of Prison Life, 55 VA. L. REV. 795, 811-12
(1969).
By the same token, prison officials must respond to emergency situations which
threaten security. Clear written rules explicitly establishing the guard's authority offers the
best accommodation of these competing needs. For an excellent discussion of how prison
rules can create a fairer, more rehabilitative environment, see James E. Robertson,
"Catchall" Prison Rules and the Courts: A Study of Judicial Review of Prison Justice, 14 ST.
Louis L. REV. 153 (1994).
25. See Jones, Jr. & Rhine, supra note 4, at 45. Note that in Haines v. Kemer, 404 U.S.
519 (1971), the Supreme Court held that, even in the prison context, where Constitutional
issues are at stake, the separation of powers doctrine will not preclude judicial review.
26. Jones, Jr. & Rhine, supra note 4, at 45. In Sandin, the majority was reluctant to
encroach on Hawaii's control of the Halawa Correctional Facility. Much of the reasoning
behind the majority opinion is rooted in the federalism theory. Justice Rehnquist forbid the
federal courts to scrutinize the daily operations of state prisons. See Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at
2299. See also discussion, infra part IV.
Robert Marks, Counsel of Record for Petitioner Cinda Sandin, posited that federal
judicial review of assignments to disciplinary segregation would undermine the values of
federalism. Brief for Petitioner at 19, Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995) (No. 93-
1911).
27. Jones, Jr. & Rhine, supra note 4, at 46. This "lack of expertise" theory is another
powerful rationale epitomizing the judiciary's reaction to prisoner litigation. It is a powerful
tool that the courts use to refuse review. The Sandin majority reinforces this theory by
instructing federal courts to afford appropriate deference to prison officials "trying to
manage a volatile atmosphere." Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2299.
Few of the lower level officials in charge of disciplinary proceedings actually possess
this "expertise." RUDOVSKY, supra note 6 at 15. Judge Sobeloff argued:
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a prevailing fear that judicial interference would undermine prison
authority, thereby compromising security and discipline.2
Even though the Supreme Court expanded the rights of the
criminal defendant during the 1960s and early 1970S,29 it continued
to ignore prisoner claims. Lower federal courts, however, gradually
began to address recurring problems within the correctional
system.3" During this era, inmates successfully asserted a number
of basic Constitutional rights.31 Prisoners won significant rights
relating to increased access to the courts, 32 enforcement of the
[P]rison guards may be more vulnerable to the corrupting influence of unchecked
authority than most people. It is well known that prisons are operated on
minimum budgets and that poor salaries and working conditions make it difficult
to attract high calibre personnel. Moreover, the "training" of the officers in
dealing with obstreperous prisoners is but a euphemism in most states.
Landman v. Peyton, 370 F.2d 135, 140 (4th Cir. 1966). See also Berger, supra note 23, at 21.
Ironically, given its current involvement in prisoner litigation, the federal judiciary may be
gaining a certain level of expertise.
28. The WolffCourt carefully considered the volatile prison environment emphasizing
that unless officials retain sufficient authority to deal with daily situations, security and the
entire correctional system are at the mercy of unmanageable prisoners. Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539, 560 (1974).
The need for control in overpopulated and violent prisons provided a key argument
for the petitioner in Sandin. Kent S. Scheidegger, on behalf of The Criminal Justice Legal
Foundation repeatedly emphasized that prison officials must retain sufficient authority to "act
flexibly, quickly, and decisively in order to limit prison violence." Amicus Curiae Brief for
Petitioner at 5, Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995) (No. 93-1911).
It is axiomatic that prisons are very violent institutions. Without authority to handle
appalling inmate behavior, prison officials would quickly lose control. In LeMaire v. Maass,
12 F.3d 1444 (9th Cir. 1993), the court tried to "paint a picture of the havoc for which [the
inmate] has been responsible." Id. The inmate had attacked a guard with his hands and
threatened to kill him, stabbed another inmate twelve times with a sharpened brass rod,
threw water, urine and feces at the guards while taunting them with foul language and
attacked yet another guard with a half-inch homemade knife. Id. at 1448-50.
Such facts illustrate that Sandin's concern with security and safety is not misplaced.
By the same token, however, unless guards are similarly constrained, the violence is only
enhanced.
29. See e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 463 (1966) (requiring law enforcement
officials to notify individuals in police custody of their right to remain silent and to obtain
counsel); Giddeon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (enforcing the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel for individuals facing felony conviction); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)
(authorizing the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence).
30. See Berger, supra note 23, at 1. The federal courts have addressed claims involving
religious freedom, correspondence, discipline and medical treatment. For an overview, see
PENELOPE CLUTE, THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF PRISONS AND JAILS (1980).
31. For a discussion of the seminal cases in each area of prisoner litigation, see e.g.,
Gavenchak, supra note 21; Jones, Jr. & Rhine, supra note 4.
32. See Adams v. Carlson, 488 F.2d 619, 630 (7th Cir. 1973) ("an inmate's right to
unfettered access to the courts is as fundamental a right as any other he may hold ... [a]ll
other rights are illusory without it"); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969) ("it is
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Eighth Amendment's prohibition against "cruel and unusual
punishment,"33 and First Amendment rights including freedom of
speech 4 and religion.
Successful prisoner litigation occasionally fostered changes in
prison management.36 In addition, as the public learned of
imprisonment's dehumanizing aspects, the "hands-off" doctrine lost
much of its vitality.37 Along with a large docket of prisoner
litigation, the lower federal courts acquired a new role, ensuring
that what little rights prisoners retained were not continually being
exploited.3
Yet, when issues relating to prisoners' rights reached the
United States Supreme Court, another form of the discredited
"hands-off" doctrine emerged. 9 To summarize its latest restric-
tive approach to prisoner litigation, the Supreme Court revived a
line from Price v. Johnson,' a case dismissing a prisoner's fourth
habeas corpus petition. Despite prisoners' successes in the lower
courts, in the late 1960s the Supreme Court continued to stress that
"lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or
fundamental that access to the courts for the purpose of presenting their complaints may not
be denied or obstructed").
33. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981) (prohibiting punishments involving
unnecessary and unrestricted infliction of pain); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (noting that
basic human dignity is the concept underlying the Eighth Amendment).
34. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (holding that the First Amendment
limited the scope of prison rules affecting speech).
35. For an overview of prisoners' First Amendment rights to exercise religion, see
generally MUSHLIN, supra note 3, at 254-312. See also Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 564 (1964)
(per curiam) (holding prisoners may state viable claims for freedom of religious expression);
Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (holding that free exercise of religion is among the rights
retained following incarceration).
36. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
37. Mushlin suggests that prisoner strikes and riots along with several popular books
written by convicts enlightened the public to.prison conditions. MUSHLIN, supra note 4, at
11. See also Jones, Jr. & Rhine, supra note 4, at 47-49. Justice Douglas, dissenting in Wolff,
cited F. COHEN, THE LEGAL CHALLENGE TO CORRECrIONS 65 (1969) as support for his
discussion of the dehumanizing aspects of prison life. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 597
(1974).
38. See generally MUSHLIN, supra note 3, at 9-11. In contrast to earlier years when the
"hand-off" doctrine was in full force, lower federal courts in the 1960's began to address
prisoner petitions on their merits. Id. Mushlin attributes the rise in prisoner claims to a
number of forces: 1) insurgence of militant and assertive prisoners; 2) the emergence of a
civil rights-liberties bar; 3) response of the federal judiciary to the plight of prisoners. Id.
39. See generally Berger, supra note 23. Berger suggests that after the first wave of
successful prisoner litigation the Supreme Court revived its interest in the due deference and
restriction of rights theories thereby chilling further legal development. Id. at 5.
40. Price v. Johnson, 334 U.S. 266 (1948).
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limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the
considerations underlying our penal system."'"
Two basic principles emerged from the string of Supreme
Court, cases decided in the late- 1960s and early 1970s, which
continued the judiciary's traditional avoidance of prisoner claims.
First, the Supreme Court's policy of "due deference" offered
presumptive validity to decisions made by prison officials.42
Mindful of their distance from prisons and sympathetic to the
reality that quick disciplinary measures play a crucial role in
quelling inmate violence, federal judges granted prison officials
significant leeway in daily prison management.43 Overall, judges
deferred to the informed judgment of prison officials intimately
versed in the maintenance of a secure and effective prison."
Second, by maintaining that incarceration works a necessary
restriction of rights, the Supreme Court acknowledged that
deprivation promotes correctional goals.45 To avoid undermining
these goals, courts quickly passed over prisoner claims challenging
the conditions of confinement.
46
These two principles appear in almost every opinion written in
a prisoner's rights case, and the vitality of the principles is virtually
unquestioned. 47 Frequently cited to defeat prisoners' claims, these
principles recently surfaced in Sandin and were instrumental to the
Court's ultimate holding.
48
B. The Initial Application of Due Process Guarantees in Inner-
Prison Disciplinary Proceedings
Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
a state cannot deprive an individual of life, liberty or property
41. Id. at 285. This quote provides great support for the majority opinion in Sandin, 115
S. Ct. at 2301. The reasoning underlying this quote pitted against the Wolff theory that
"prisoners do not shed all of their Constitutional rights at the prison gate" epitomizes the
Supreme Court's struggle with balancing rights in the prison context. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 555.
42. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979) ("Prison administrators... should be
accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of polices and practices that
in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain
institutional security"). Id.
43. See discussion supra notes 28, 29.
44. Berger, supra note 23, at 5.
45. Price, 334 U.S. at 285.
46. Berger, supra note 23, at 5.
47. E.g., Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215,224 (1989); Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238,
245 (1983); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974).
48. See discussion infra part IV.
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without affording the citizen due process of law.4 9 When a
government decision threatens to have a substantially adverse effect
on an individual's interest in life, liberty or property, basic forms of
procedural due process are required." Fairness requires that an
individual threatened with government deprivation receive notice
of the pending deprivation and an opportunity to be heard. In
principle, procedural due process is designed to ensure that
individual rights are not capriciously or arbitrarily abrogated." By
shielding the individual against an unwarranted deprivation of
important rights, procedural due process plays a significant role in
the maintenance of a democratic society."
Although it is a rather clouded concept, due process attempts
to accommodate the interests of both the government and the
individual. 4 Basic procedural due process analysis requires a two-
step inquiry.55 First, the court must ascertain whether a liberty or
property interest as defined within the meaning of the Clause is at
stake. 6 If a protected right is implicated, the need for procedural
safeguards is triggered. 7 After assessing the circumstances, the
court then determines the amount of process necessary to protect
the individual against an unwarranted deprivation. 8 The amount
of process due ultimately depends upon a balancing test designed
49. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
50. E.g., Kentucky Dep't. of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989).
51. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965) (the fundamental requirement of due
process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time in a meaningful manner); Parratt
v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 540 (1981) (noting that a meaningful opportunity to be heard is the
most fundamental component of due process). For an in-depth look at the Parratt decision,
see Leon Friedman, Parratt v. Taylor: Opening and Closing the Door on Section 1983, 9
HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 545 (1982). See also Sourbeer v. Robinson, 791 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir.
1986) (noting that perfunctory monthly reviews denied the inmate an opportunity to be
heard).
52. See e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). Note that while procedural due
process attempts to minimize the risk of erroneous decisions, it does not require correct or
error-free determinations. See e.g., Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 (1979).
53. RUDOVSKY, supra note 5, at 19. Rudovsky suggests developing "ways ... to involve
prisoners in the process of making decisions that affect every aspect of their life in prison."
Id.
54. In Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960), the Supreme Court acknowledged
that "[d]ue process is an elusive concept. Its exact boundaries are undefinable, and its
content varies according to specific factual contexts." Id.
55. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 479-81 (1972).
56. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972).
57. Id.
58. Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989).
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to measure the individual's interests against the government's
interests.
59
To ensure adequate protection of the individual, procedural
due process must be a flexible concept capable of adapting to the
infinite contexts in which government action may arise.' Three
factors help determine the specific dictates of due process that are
necessary in any given context.61 First, the court must examine
the nature of the private individual interest threatened by govern-
ment action.62 Second, the court asks whether a particular set of
procedures is sufficient to avoid an erroneous decision.63 Here the
court must assess the probable value of any additional or substitute
procedural safeguards. The court must account for the government
function involved, plus any administrative or fiscal burdens that
could result from requiring different or additional safeguards.
6"
Finally, the court weighs the government's interest in the particular
deprivation. As noted in Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers. v.
McElroy, it is axiomatic that "[d]ue process, unlike some legal
rules, is not a technical concept with fixed content unrelated to
time, place and circumstances.,
66
Striking the due process balance in the prison context has been
an ongoing challenge. The government's interest in maintaining
orderly, secure prisons has traditionally preempted inmates' due
process claims because discipline is essential in prisons. By
definition, prisons "are places of involuntary confinement of
persons who have demonstrated proclivity for antisocial, criminal
and often violent behavior. ' 67 Due process requirements histori-
cally did not even apply to inner-prison disciplinary proceedings
59. Id.
60. E.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (noting the truism that due
process is a flexible concept); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) ("Due Process
is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.").
61. Mathews, 424 U.S. 319.
62. Id. at 335.
63. Id.
64. Id. See also Henry J. Friendly, 'Some Kind of Hearing'; 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267,
1276 (1975) (noting that at some point the benefit of additional procedural safeguards to the
individual is outweighed by the cost of providing such protection).
65. 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
66. Id. at 895.
67. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984).
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because, as "slaves of the state," prisoners did not have any liberty
or property left to lose.68
Courts gradually began to recognize that "a prisoner retains all
of the rights of an ordinary citizen except those expressly taken
away from him by law.",69 As inmates successfully exercised other
constitutional rights, courts acknowledged the Fourteenth Amend-
ment required procedural due process whenever prison officials
threatened an inmate with a substantial loss or substantial change
in the prisoner's confinement conditions.7" Initially, however, the
courts assessed a prisoner's need for due process protection
according to how the particular deprivation fit within the
rights/privileges distinction.71 To the courts, prisoners' freedoms
were easily labelled "privileges," since it was the government's
benevolence which granted prisoners privileges such as telephone
calls and visits.72 In practice, these benefits were revoked for
necessity or at the whim of a guard.73 Procedural safeguards were
rarely considered prior to the revocation of such benefits.74
With the Supreme Court's decision in Goldberg v. Kelly,75
however, procedural safeguards were deemed necessary to protect
certain state-created benefits.76 The rights/privileges doctrine was
subsequently discredited77 and an explosion of due process claims
68. Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt) 790, 796 (1871). See also William D.
Wick, Procedural Due Process in Prison Disciplinary Hearings: The Case for Specific
Constitutional Requirements, 18 S.D. L. REV. 309 (1973) (demanding the safeguards afforded
one year later in Wolf]).
69. Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944). Wick credits Coffin as a major
breakthrough. A court was finally willing to extend Constitutional rights to prisoners. Wick,
supra note 68, at 315.
70. In early decisions, this test was dubbed "grievous loss." See MUSHLIN, supra note
3, at 431-33.
71. Under the 'rights/privileges' doctrine, only those interests classified as rights were
guaranteed Constitutional protection. Any right deemed a mere privilege did not trigger
procedural protections. See McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517 (1892);
William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law,
81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968); Herman, supra note 2, at 486-88.
72. See generally, HAZEL B. KERPER & JANEEN KERPER, LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE
CONVICTED (1974) (assessing the hierarchy of prisoners' rights).
73. KERPER & KERPER, supra note 72, at 282 (noting that a benefit labelled a
"privilege" could be revoked at the discretion of the administrative agency involved).
74. KERPER & KERPER, supra note 72.
75. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
76. Id.
77. In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) the Court finally rejected the
"wooden distinction between rights and privileges that once served to govern the
applicability of procedural due process rights." Id. at 571-72. See e.g. Graham v. Richardson,
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followed.78  Realizing that the Due Process Clause itself offered
few protections in the context of inner-prison disciplinary proceed-
ings, prisoners began to look to state-created interests to invoke
their right to "some kind of hearing '79 prior to being disciplined.
III. The Development of the State-Created Liberty Interest
Approach in the Prison Context
A. The Roots of the Positivist Approach
"Positivist law" is law created by acts and practices of
legislators and administrators.8" The term encompasses statutes
and regulations promulgated by federal and state governments and
administrative regulations, such as those which govern the prison
system.8 In terms of due process, the positivist theory requires
procedural protections whenever the government threatens a
property or liberty interest held by virtue of legislative or adminis-
trative enactment.82 The positivist theory gained credibility in the
early 1970s following the Supreme Court's landmark decision in
Goldberg v. Kelly.83
In Goldberg, the Court considered whether an evidentiary
hearing was required before the state could terminate a recipient's
welfare benefits.8' Analyzing the competing interests, the Court
characterized welfare benefits as "statutory entitlements." 5 Since
403 U.S. 365 (1971).
78. Significant cases spearheading this revolution included: Bell v. Burson 402 U.S. 535
(1972); Perry v. Sinderman 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). See also
Friendly, supra note 64, at 1268. See generally Herman, supra note 2. It is crucial to
remember, however, that an expectation of receiving process is not a protected liberty
interest in and of itself. See e.g., Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250 (1983); United
States v. Jiles, 658 F. 2d 194, 200 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 923 (1981); Bills v.
Henderson, 631 F.2d 1287, 1298 (6th Cir. 1980).
79. The now famous label "some kind of hearing" was coined by Justice White in Wolff
v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557, (1974), and used by Henry Friendly to sum up the rapid
development of administrative procedures that followed the Goldberg opinion. See generally
Friendly, supra note 64.
80. Herman, supra note 3, at 484 n.2.
81. See supra note 20 (defining "positivist" law).
82. For a general overview of how the positivist approach to liberty interests works, see
Herman, supra note 3.
83. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 262. Much of the reasoning in Goldberg centered on a theory offered by
Charles Reich. Reich suggested that, as the individual became progressively more dependent
on forms of wealth specifically created by the government, the relationship between the
individual and the government changed. See generally Charles Reich, The New Property, 73
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the facts presented indicated that the state's action threatened to
deprive a woman of her only means of subsistence, the Court held
that the weight of the loss triggered the need for procedural
safeguards.86 From Goldberg, the Court ultimately developed the
statutory entitlement concept into a working method of constitu-
tional analysis.87
According to the statutory entitlement concept, government
action which threatens to take a property or liberty interest granted
by positive law triggers procedural safeguards in favor of the
affected individual. However, in Board of Regents v. Roth,88 the
Court repudiated its former determination that the weight of the
interest or the impact of its deprivation dictated the amount of
process due.89 In Roth the Supreme Court decided instead that,
once the threatened interest is characterized as a property or
liberty interest guaranteed under positive law, it is the "nature" of
the deprivation that dictates whether application of the Due
Process Clause is triggered.9°
Determining whether a liberty or a property interest guaran-
teed by positive law was threatened became the fundamental first
step in the analysis. This requirement had a major implication for
prisoners demanding due process for disciplinary proceedings,91
because prisoners rarely retain any property following incarcera-
tion." State action therefore can only deprive the inmate of what
YALE L. J. 733 (1964).
86. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 265. Otherwise known as the "grievous loss" concept, the.
weight of the interest was determined by the impact of the threatened deprivation on the
individual. Even prior to Goldberg, the grievous loss concept frequently determined the
amount of process due. For example, in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath,
341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951), the Supreme Court stated that whether any procedural protection
was due depends on the extent to which an individual will be "condemned to suffer grievous
loss." Id.
87. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 265.
88. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
89. Id. at 570-71.
90. Id. Herman, supra note 2, points out that the due process theory under Roth leaves
a gap in the law. Accordingly, an individual suffering grievous loss may still be denied
procedural safeguards if the interest at stake fails to qualify as either a liberty or property
interest. Herman points to Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959) (due process
required whenever governmental action seriously injured individuals) and concludes that the
Roth analysis threatened a measure of unfairness contrary to the theory behind the Due
Process Clause. Herman, supra note 2.
91. See Herman, supra note 2, at 502.
92. Gavenchak, supra note 21, at 390 n.28.
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"residuum of liberty" remains.93 As one commentator noted, the
power of the state "is manifested through variation in the condi-
tions of an inmate's confinement. [Tjhese conditions-which may
include a wide variety of possible privileges and rehabilitative
opportunities potentially categorizable as intangible property
interests-are most appropriately characterized as liberty inter-
ests.
, 94
"Liberty" was initially defined by the courts as "freedom from
restraint."95 Ultimately, the liberty protected by the Due Process
Clause expanded to embrace freedoms and values central to
American democratic society. For example, claimants have
successfully asserted liberty interests in reputation and personal
autonomy.97 It is crucial to realize that the early cases held that
liberty interests such as those listed were protected directly by the
Due Process Clause. In contrast, statutory entitlements such as
welfare benefits did not quite fit within the concepts of "life, liberty
and property" as enumerated in the Fourteenth Amendment.98
To clarify the statutory entitlement concept, Justice Rehnquist,
in Paul v. Davis,99 finally divided "liberty" into two distinct
categories."l The first category consists of the "fundamental
liberties" such as the "right to life, liberty and the pursuit of
happiness," '' which originated in the Bill of Rights and are
protected directly by the Due Process Clause." The second
93. See e.g., Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 466 (1989)
(Marshall, J., dissenting); Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245 (1983); Connecticut Bd. of
Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458,469 (1981); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491 (1980). See
also, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 598 (1974). (Douglas J., dissenting) ("[e]very
prisoner's liberty is, of course, circumscribed by the very fact of incarceration, but his interest
in the limited liberty left to him is then only the more substantial").
94. Gavenchak, supra note 21, at 390 n.28.
95. See e.g., Focha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 90 (1992) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("As
incarceration of persons is the most common and one of the most feared instruments of state
oppression and state indifference, we ought to acknowledge at the outset that freedom from
restraint is essential to the basic definition of liberty"). See generally Henry Paul Monaghan,
Of Liberty and Property, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 405 (1977).
96. E.g., Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
97. See e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) ("[Liberty] denotes not merely
freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract ... and
generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness..." ).
98. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262.
99. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 710.
102. Id. at 711.
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category contains the "state-created liberty interests" which,
although not constitutionally recognized, nevertheless command
Due Process Clause protection.0 3
Procedural issues arise whenever the government possesses
power to deprive an individual of liberty or property.
Non-incarcerated individuals tend not only to challenge the state's
right to deprive them of their liberty interest in terms of substan-
tive due process," but also to challenge the state's right to even
interfere with their liberty interest.
In the prison context, however, the power of the state is
undeniable." Once lawfully incarcerated, inmates retain only the
degree of liberty which is compatible with the prison environment
and permitted by the state. °6  By definition prisoners lose the
"liberty" traditionally associated with non-incarcerated individuals.
Prisoners instead depend upon the state to grant them any
remaining freedom. Within this unique context of prisoners'
procedural due process claims, the Supreme Court found ground
for the development and perfection of the theory of state-created
liberty interests.0 7
B. Utilizing the State-Created Liberty Interest Approach in the
Prison Context
1. Three Cases Delineate Due Process Requirements.
a. Morrissey v. Brewer-Parole Revocation. -In Morrissey v.
Brewer, 8 the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether
revocation of parole implicates a liberty interest protected by the
Due Process Clause.109 The parole system as established in every
state implicitly recognizes that parole will not be revoked if the
parolee abides by certain conditions."0  Even though parole
contemplates state supervision, the Court held that parolees
103. Id. at 710-12. In a sense, state-created liberty interests which did not pass the Roth
test were given a second chance at constitutional protection. See Herman, supra note 2, at
500.
104. See Herman, supra note 2, at 502.
105. Id. at 503.
106. Id.
107. Id. For a more thorough discussion of why prisoner litigation and the positivist
theory grew simultaneously, see Herman, id. at 501-03.
108. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
109. Id. at 472.
110. Id. at 479.
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nevertheless possess a "valuable" liberty interest."t  Free to
participate in many normal activities such as employment and
family life, parolees "rely on at least [an] implicit promise" that
they will not be returned to prison unless they break their parole
terms."' Even though the state needs to be able to incarcerate a
parole breaker without having to duplicate a full adversarial trial,
the Morrissey Court held that parole may not be revoked prior to
affording the parolee some informal procedure."3
Moreover, the Court asserted that society also holds a valid interest
in the parolee's situation, since fair treatment of the parolee
"enhance[s] the chance of rehabilitation by avoiding reactions to
arbitrariness."'' 4 After Morrissey, the idea that procedural due
process can foster rehabilitation became a recurring theme among
dissenting Justices whenever the Supreme Court grappled with
prisoner issues.115
The Morrissey Court ultimately delineated six requirements to
guarantee minimum due process for parole revocation proceed-
ings.116 First, the parolee was entitled to written notice of the
alleged violation."7 Second, full disclosure of adverse evidence
was required.11 8 Third, the parolee was guaranteed an opportuni-
ty to be heard as well as an opportunity to present evidence and
witnesses on his behalf.119 Fourth, the parolee had a right to
confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses unless the circum-
stances rendered this practice hazardous.' 2° Fifth, a neutral and
detached hearing body was required.121  Finally, if parole was
revoked, the parolee must have received a written statement
111. Id. at 482.
112. Id.
113. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 483.
114. Id. at 484. Justice Douglas concurred, adding that "[airbitrary actions in the
revocation of paroles can only impede and impair the rehabilitative aspects of modem
penology." Id. at 499. The Supreme Court erroneously retreats from this very basic
principle in Sandin. See discussion infra part VI.
115. Kentucky Dep't. of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454,486 (1989)(Marshall, J.,
dissenting); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 597 (1974)(Douglas, J., dissenting).
116. Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
117. Id. at 486.
118. Id. at 471.
119. Id.
120. Id. The hearing officer determines "whether an informant would be subject to risk
of harm if his identity were disclosed ...." Id.
121. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 486. According to the Court, the independent officer need
not be a judicial officer but should not be the supervising officer. Id.
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complete with factual findings and the hearing body's ultimate
rationale.'22
The Morrissey opinion offered two significant principles. First,
since it originated in the prison context, it epitomized the flexibility
of the due process concept which "tailors the process that is
required to the specific factual context under review."'123 Second,
by pointing out that a parolee retains "many of the core values of
unqualified liberty,"'24 the Court necessarily implied that liberty
and government custody are not mutually exclusive concepts."
Lower federal courts subsequently expanded the Morrissey due
process requirements to cases involving inner-prison disciplinary
proceedings.'26 Noting variances among the Circuit Courts of
Appeal in 1974, the Supreme Court accepted and decided Wolff v.
McDonnell, the landmark decision that defined prisoners' procedur-
al due process rights. 27
b. Wolff v. McDonnell-The Due Process Applicable to Inner-
Prison Disciplinary Proceedings. -The Wolff Court revolu-
tionized prisoners' rights litigation by clarifying that the Morrissey
due process requirements did reach inner-prison disciplinary
proceedings. 128  Overall, Wolff established ground-breaking
precedent by explicitly recognizing the legitimacy of asserting
liberty interests that originate in state regulations. 129  According
to the Wolff Majority, such state-created liberty interests ultimately
trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause.'30  Wolff
suggested that, despite the loss of the fundamental liberties,
122. Id. at 487. Since the revocation proceeding need not be formal, findings of fact and
conclusions of law are not necessary. Id.
123. See e.g., Jones, Jr. & Rhine, supra note, 4 at 59. See also Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d
701 (7th Cir. 1972).
124. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482.
125. See Gavenchak, supra note 21, at 392.
126. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 572 n.20 (1974) (listing cases where the Courts
of Appeal had split on the issue of what procedures are due in the context of inner-prison
disciplinary proceedings).
127. Id. at 539. In Wolff for example, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that,
while Morrissey applied generally to prison disciplinary proceedings, the specific require-
ments of due process were to be determined by the District Courts. Id. at 544. For a
discussion of how the lower courts applied Morrissey, see Wick, supra note 66.
128. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 558.
129. Id. ("We think a person's liberty is equally protected, even when the liberty itself
is a statutory creation of the State").
130. Id.
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prisoners could nevertheless invoke the Due Process Clause by
locating a state-created liberty interest.
t 31
Wolff focused on the disciplinary regime as outlined by
Nebraska's statutes and prison regulations.1 32  Under Nebraska
law, punishment for flagrant misconduct included forfeiture of
good-time credits133 and/or confinement in a disciplinary cell.
The Court first examined the reality of prison fife and voiced some
concerns unique to prison litigation. In an oft-quoted line, the
Wolff Court stated that, although an inmate does not retain many
of the rights of the ordinary citizen, "a prisoner is not wholly
stripped of constitutional protections.. . . [T]here is no iron curtain
drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this coun-
try.' 4 However, having established that the right to due process
is a constitutional right unextinguished by incarceration, the Court
added that it must adjust to the unique needs of the correctional
environment. 35 Overall, the Wolff Court approved of a mutual
accommodation between the institution's interests and the constitu-
tional rights of its inmates.
After laying down the basic principles, the Wolff Court
examined the character of the state-created liberty interest in good-
time credits.'36 Nebraska had provided a statutory right to good-
time by specifying a finding of flagrant misconduct as the predicate
for revocation of previously earned credits.'37 Characterizing the
131. Id.
132. For the full text of the Nebraska statutes and regulations at issue, see id. at 547-53.
133. Good-time credits are earned for maintaining appropriate behavior. They work to
reduce the overall sentence. For example, the regulations at issue in Wolff provided:
(1) The chief executive officer of a facility shall reduce, for parole purposes, for
good behavior and faithful performance of duties while confined in a facility the
term of a committed offender as follows: Two months on the first year, two
months on the second year, three months on the third year...
(3) ... Determinations of loss of good time are directly relevant to receiving
parole ....
Wolff, 418 U.S. at 546-47 (citing NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1,107 (Cum. Supp. 1972)).
134. Id. at 556.
135. Id. The Supreme Court frequently reinforces its overriding concern with internal
prison security. See, e.g., Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5 (1981); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520
(1979); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977); Procunier v.
Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974). Therefore, security is always carefully considered in the
Court's due process balance.
136. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 547-52.
137. Id. at 539 (citing NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-185 (Cum Supp. 1972)).
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inmate's interest as one of "real substance," '138 the Court held that
inmates were entitled to the minimum amount of constitutional due
process prior to having their good time credits revoked. 39 Such
procedural safeguards were deemed necessary to ensure that
inmates were not arbitrarily deprived of a state created interest."
Having found the requisite liberty interest, the Wolff Court
proceeded to strike the due process balance by first examining the
State's interest in swift, effective disciplinary proceedings."'
Ruling that some of the Morrissey requirements were not practical
in the highly volatile prison context, the Court ultimately differenti-
ated between revocation of parole and inner-prison discipline. 42
First the Court noted that disciplinary proceedings often involve
recidivist inmates who resent the State's authority and despise
other inmates.43 Second, the Court recognized the reality that
disciplinary proceedings occur in tightly controlled environ-
ments.'" Inmates and guards frequently resent one another and
inmates are often swayed by unwritten rules of loyalty to protect
one another.'45 In light of these concerns, however, the Court
acknowledged that fair disciplinary hearings may foster respect and
trust for the system.' 6 Procedural due process could be an
integral part of rehabilitation.147 Overall, Wolff provided the
Court with a unique opportunity to balance the constitutional
mandate of fairness against the state's interest in secure, authoritar-
ian prisons.
An integral part of the, Wolff decision was the adaptation of
the Morrissey due process requirements to the context of inner-
prison disciplinary proceedings. As opposed to the six require-
ments listed in Morrissey, the Wolff Court required that only two
138. Id. at 557. The Court's finding is reminiscent of the language used in Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). See discussion supra part III.A.
139. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557, While there is no constitutional right to good-time credit,
the Court nonetheless concluded that because good-time credits ultimately affect the length
of an inmate's sentence, the state had, in effect, actually guaranteed earlier release. An
inmate's interest in earlier release is analogous to the fundamental liberty enjoyed by free
people. Id.
140. Id
141. Id. at 558.
142. Id. at 560.
143. Id. at 561.
144. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 561.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 563.
147. Id. at 562. See also infra notes 148 and 153.
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basic procedures accompany a disciplinary charge. 14'8 First,
advance written notice must be provided to an inmate charged with
a disciplinary infraction. 49 The notice functions to clarify the
charge and to prompt the inmate to marshal a defense. Second,
Wolff explicitly requires the disciplinary committee to prepare a
written statement in support of its final decision."5°
With these two requirements set in stone, the Wolff Court
willingly modified other traditional procedural safeguards to avoid
compromising prison security. For example, while it is well
recognized that the right to call witnesses is inherently valuable to
ascertaining the truth, Wolff limited an inmate's right to insist upon
witnesses at a disciplinary hearing.' A prison official may
accordingly foreclose an inmate's right to call witnesses on her
behalf where doing so would threaten security or undermine prison
authority.152
Similarly, in an attempt to facilitate effective prison manage-
ment, the Court explicitly refused to enumerate strict due process
mandates applicable to every inner-prison disciplinary proceed-
ing. ' Under the circumstances, the Wolff Court found the rights
to confrontation and cross-examination too hazardous to allow in
the prison environ-ment.
Recognizing that retaliation would accompany the practice of
allowing inmates to testify against one another at disciplinary
hearings, the Wolff Court stressed that the burden of these added
procedural safeguards outweighed their utility.155 By mandating
two procedural safeguards and substantially modifying others, Wolff
exemplifies the flexibility of the due process concept. The Wolff
Court tailored procedural requirements to further inmate rehabili-
tation without disrupting the state's ability to discipline those
inmates who violate prison rules.156
148. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 566-67.
152. Id. at 566.
153. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 567. The Wolff Court stated: "[tihere is this much play in the
joints of the Due Process Clause, and we stop short of imposing a more demanding rule with
respect to witnesses and documents." Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 567.
156. Note that in Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976), the Supreme Court refused
to extend procedural safeguards in disciplinary hearings beyond those guaranteed under
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Wolff also contained two important dissents which shared, as
a basic theme, the idea that prisoners must be protected against the
type of arbitrary decision making that pervades the prison sys-
tem. t57 The first dissent, while agreeing that freedom from
serious discipline implicates a protected liberty interest, argued that
the content which the Majority's holding gave to the necessary
procedural safeguards "leaves these noble holdings as little more
than empty promises. '  Justices Marshall and Brennan were
convinced that the Majority's modification of the due process
requirements to fit the inner-disciplinary context would ensure that
"the charged inmate will invariably be the loser."' 159 They warned
that the lack of certain due process requirements theoretically
increases the chances of an erroneous decision." -
In the second dissent, Justice Douglas maintained that the
imposition of a substantial deprivation of liberty, such as solitary
confinement, 6' is a loss which triggers the full panoply of due
Wolff. Yet, the New Jersey Supreme Court held in Avant v. Clifford, 341 A.2d 629 (N.J.
1975), that the Constitution of New Jersey required greater protection to state prisoners
faced with disciplinary charges.
157. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 580 (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined in part by Brennan, J); Id. at
593 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
158. Id. at 581.
159. Id. at 582.
160. Id.
161. Solitary confinement as an inner-prison disciplinary practice has been hotly contested
in terms of the Eighth Amendment. See Behind Closed Doors, supra note 4, at 930-34.
Inmates in solitary confinement are secluded twenty-four hours a day in a small cell
(frequently called "the hole") without windows or ventilation. They receive a restricted diet,
minimal chances to shower or exercise and lose all of their privileges including correspon-
dence. See Jacobs & Sharma, supra note 11, at 10. During his thirty-day confinement,
Conner was given 50 minutes a day total for solitary bathing and exercise. Conner remained
shackled in leg and waist irons during his periods away from his cell. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. 2305
(Breyer, J., dissenting). See generally Raymond H. Thoenig, Comment, Solitary Confinement:
Punishment Within the Letter of the Law or Psychological Torture?, 1972 Wis. L. REV. 223.
Punitive or disciplinary segregation must be differentiated from administrative
segregation. While disciplinary segregation is imposed for breaches of prison rules,
administrative segregation is imposed for security and safety reasons regardless of the
individual inmate's behavior. See United States ex rel Gereau v. Henderson, 526 F.2d 889
(5th Cir. 1976). For example, in Pennsylvania, inmates can be placed in administrative
segregation pending disciplinary charges or when an inmate either becomes a security threat
or needs to be protected. 37 PA. CODE § 95.107 (1978).
Administrative segregation creates complex legal issues as well. See, e.g. James E.
Robertson, The Constitution In Protective Custody: An Analysis of the Rights of Protective
Custody Inmates, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 91 (1987). With the prevalence of rape and assault in
the nation's prisons, administrative segregation is frequently imposed to protect new and
weaker inmates. See, e.g., Sourbeer v. Robinson, 791 F.2d 1094 (3d. Cir. 1986) (fifteen year-
old who had murdered his mother was placed in administrative segregation); Farmer v.
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process safeguards. 162  Justice Douglas also argued that the
pervasive problems accompanying the arbitrary and unchecked
power of prison guards require that inmates be allowed to confront
their accusers.' 63 Citing to numerous social and psychological
studies, Justice Douglas emphasized that a fundamental connection
exists between fair treatment of the inmate by the government
during incarceration and a subsequent successful social reassimila-
tion. 164 Fostering the prison guard's monarchical authority at a
disciplinary hearing merely cultivates an inmate's distrust of the
system.
The Wolff Court examined both revocation of good-time
credits and solitary confinement to decide what procedural
safeguards apply to inner-prison disciplinary proceedings. 65
Commentators, noting the two types of discipline discussed in
Wolff, interpret the decision to imply that due process is triggered
whenever punishment for misconduct involves a significant change
in an inmate's condition of confinement.' 66 According to the
Nebraska prison regulations effective in 1974, however, the ultimate
consequence of either loss of good-time credits or solitary confine-
ment was lengthened prison time.67 Loss of good-time credits
translated into a lost opportunity for early release."6 Similarly,
a solitary confinement inmate received a notation on her record
which could sour the chances of being paroled.169  Arguably,
Wolff was still very similar to Morrissey since both cases involved
a tangible liberty interest in the form of early release which was
being threatened by state action.
Carlson, 685 F. Supp. 1335 (M.D. Pa. 1988) (placing a transvestite inmate in administrative
segregation for security reasons did not violate due process).
162. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 601 (Douglas, J. dissenting in part).
163. Id. at 599-600. See also In re Birdsong, 39 F. 599, 600 (S.D. Ga. 1889) ("[t]he
arbitrary power in a prison-keeper ... to select at his pleasure a penalty which he thinks
adequate as a disciplinary measure for real or fancied misconduct is intolerable among a free
and enlightened people"). A pervasive practice used to foster the monarchial authority is
the vague, catchall prison rule that often sanctions punishment for otherwise innocent
conduct. See generally, Robertson, supra note 24.
164. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 593-601. Justice Douglas highlights the enduring problem with
the unchecked discretion of the prison official and its effect on inmates. Id. at 600.
165. Id. at 547. The Nebraska regulations authorized either disciplinary confinement or
revocation of good time credits for flagrant or serious misconduct. Id.
166. See, e.g., Gavenchak, supra note 21, at 393.
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In the following decade, Wolff provided the applicable analysis
for a series of Supreme Court cases involving disciplinary proceed-
ings.170 In most of these cases the Court affirmed the positivist
approach to liberty interests by assessing prisoners' interests
according to the applicable statutes and regulations. 71
Many critics of the Supreme Court's prison jurisprudence have
suggested that the positivist approach utilized throughout the 1970s
actually restricted prisoner litigation.172  This occurred because
successful prisoner litigation centered around those liberty interests
specifically created by the state. A close reading of the Supreme
Court cases exposes language of the "hands-off" era of prisoner
litigation creeping back into the analysis. 73 Although Wolff was
initially hailed as the landmark case for prisoners' rights, the
Court's application of the decision emphasized that prisoners had
won little more than a paper right to procedural due process.
c. Meachum v. Fano-Incarceration Presupposes
Adversity. -The next significant case in the long line of Supreme
Court prison cases was Meachum v. Fano.174  In Meachum the
Court concluded that the Due Process Clause did not entitle a state
prisoner to a hearing prior to being transferred175 to a prison with
less favorable conditions. The Court reasoned that, "given a valid
conviction, the criminal defendant has been constitutionally
deprived of his liberty to the extent that the State may confine him
and subject him to the rules of the prison system so long as the
conditions of confinement do not otherwise violate the Constitu-
tion. '  Confinement in any of the state's prisons was therefore
170. See, e.g., Connecticut. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458 (1980); Hughes v.
Rowe, 449 U.S. 5 (1980); Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976).
171. Dumschat, 452 U.S. at 460 (construing state statute on parole eligibility); Hughes,
449 U.S. at 13 (construing an administrative regulation on placement in holding unit prior
to investigation of allegations of violence).
172. Jones, Jr. & Rhine, supra note 4, at 120-22.
173. Id.
174. 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
175. Even after Meachum, many courts have struggled with the constitutional issues
attending intra-prison transfers. For example, depending on where the receiving institution
is located, the inmate may suffer a significant deprivation. Being transferred across the
nation can mean loss of contact with family and termination of rehabilitation programs. See
Meachum, 427 U.S. at 235 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Only punitive transfers generally require
due process protections. See, e.g. Montayne v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236 (1976) (inter-prison
transfer); Aikens v. Lash, 514 F.2d 55 (7th Cir. 1975).
176. Meachum, 427 U.S. at 224.
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found to be a condition contemplated by the prisoner's initial
sentence. Such a transfer was "within the normal limits or range
of custody which the conviction has authorized the State to
impose."'
77
Reasoning that prison officials control the "ordinary incidents
of prison life," the Meachum Court rejected the argument that any
substantial deprivation automatically triggers procedural safe-
guards. 7 ' In this instance, the state had not codified a statutory
right to remain in a particular prison. No statute or regulation like
that at issue in Wolff existed to create a vested liberty interest.
Instead, Massachusetts officials possessed unfettered discretion over
transfers and could transfer inmates with or without a finding of
misconduct. 79 The Court interpreted the lack of regulation to
mean that Massachusetts prison officials could transfer inmates for
"whatever reason or no reason at all."'' Any expectation
harbored by the inmates that, absent misbehavior, they would
remain in a particular prison was too attenuated to trigger
procedural safeguards.'
Moreover, the Meachum Majority refused to preside over
issues, such as transfer, which are unique to the daily functioning
of state prisons.182 The Court expressly declined to interpret the
Due Process Clause to require federal supervision of the states'
inner-prison disciplinary proceedings.8 3  At the same time,
however, the Court did note that individual states could guarantee
pre-transfer hearings under their own constitutions or laws. 84
The dissenting Justices in Meachum unanimously rejected the
Majority's concept of "liberty" and challenged the entire theory of
state-created liberty interests as it had been cultivated by the
Supreme Court. 8 The dissenters argued that the Due Process
Clause protects the liberty innate in every human being.8 6 The
177. Id. at 225.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 227, n.20.
180. Id. at 228.
181. Meachum, 427 U.S. at 228.
182. Id. at 229.
183. Id.
184. Id. Meachum ultimately held that the Due Process Clause itself did not impose a
nationwide rule requiring pre-transfer procedures. Id. at 229.
185. Id. at 229 (Stevens, J., dissenting joined by Brennan, J., and Marshall, J.).
186. Meachum, 427 U.S. at 230.
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state may limit this type of liberty but it can never create it.',,
The dissenters accused the Meachum Majority of breathing new life
into the discredited slavery theory. 8  They reasoned that if
inmates possess only the liberty granted them by the state, they are
necessarily slaves. Rejecting the state-created liberty concept, the
dissenters posited that even inmates retain a fundamental liberty
interest or "at the very minimum, the right to be treated with
dignity-which the Constitution may never ignore."189
The dissenting Justices found it significant that a large
percentage of the nation's population will spend time incarcerat-
ed. 9 ° They emphasized the great social value of procedural
safeguards in disciplinary proceedings by highlighting the docu-
mented correlation between fair treatment and eventual resocializa-
tion of inmates.1 9' These Justices posited that the inmate's right
to be treated with dignity is as vital as the State's interest in
promoting rehabilitation.'92  They suggested that "significant
deprivations of liberty" should be the bright line triggering
application of due process.' 93
187. Citing to Steven's Meachum dissent in Sandin v. Connor, Justice Ginsburg
summarized one of the ironies implicit in the state-created liberty approach:
Deriving protected liberty interests from mandatory language in prison codes
would make of the fundamental right something more in certain States, something
less in others. Liberty that may vary from Ossining, New York, to San Quentin,
California, does not resemble the "Liberty" enshrined among "unalienable Rights"
with which all persons are "endowed by their Creator."
Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2303 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting).
188. Meachum, 427 U.S. at 223; see also Berger, supra note 23, at 9; Gavenchak, supra
note 21, at 395.
189. Meachum, 427 U.S. at 233 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissenters quoted the
President's Task Force:
A first tenet of our governmental, religious and ethical tradition is the intrinsic
worth of every individual, no matter how degenerate. It is a radical departure
from that tradition to subject a defined class of person, even criminals, to a regime
in which their right to liberty is determined by officials wholly unaccountable for
the exercise of their power.
Id. at 232, n.4. The Sandin dissenters also acknowledge that imprisonment does not relegate
an individual to sub-citizen status. See Sandin, 115 S. Ct at 2303.
190. Meachum, 427 U.S. at 233, n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 233.
192. Id. at 234.
193. Id. at 235, n.7. Robert Marks advocated on behalf of the Petitioner that the
Supreme Court adopt a bright-line rule limiting the liberty interests that trigger due process
to those directly impacting the length of an inmate's sentence. See Brief for Petitioner at 21,
Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995) (No. 93-1911).
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Despite the value placed on procedural safeguards in the
disciplinary context by the dissent, the Meachum opinion seemed
to signify a shift in the Court's treatment of prisoners' due process
claims.'94 While in Wolff due process could be triggered by either
the deprivation's significance or the degree of change in surround-
ing conditions, Meachum focused instead on the origin of the
liberty interest itself. 95 According to the Meachum Court, the
proper analysis focused on the degree to which the prison official's
discretion was regulated by state law.'96
Under the Meachum analysis, tightly restricted discretion
would trigger procedural safeguards. For example, if a state
regulation explicitly stated that an inmate could be transferred only
when a certain rule was broken, the prison official's discretion to
transfer would be limited to situations in which a disciplinary
committee actually found that the inmate had broken the particular
rule. Unfettered discretion, on the other hand, would preclude the
need for safeguards. In the latter instance, where an inmate could
be disciplined even in the absence of misconduct, procedural
safeguards have no role to play.
The Meachum analysis is best understood in contrast to the
situation presented in Wolff. While in Wolff Nebraska officials
were instructed to find misconduct prior to revoking good-time
credits, the Massachusetts officials in Meachum had full discretion
over transfer decisions.1 97  The "predicate" that invoked the
application of due process in Wolff was not duplicated under
Massachusetts law. Inmates were thereby subject to the unchecked
discretion of the prison officials.
2. Meachum Evolves Into a Search for Mandatory
Language. -Building on the mode of analysis utilized in
Meachum, the Supreme Court developed its theory of state-created
liberty interests in two subsequent cases. Both Greenholtz v.
Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex'98 and
Hewitt v. Helms 9 placed great emphasis on the degree to which
prison officials' discretion is specified under positive law. The
194. See Berger, supra note 23, at 9; Gavenchak, supra note 21, at 395.
195. See Meachum, 427 U.S. at 226.
196. Id. at 226-27.
197. Id.
198. 442 U.S. 1 (1979).
199. 459 U.S. 460 (1983).
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relevant inquiry: (1) focused on the statute or regulation thought
to confer a liberty interest upon the inmate,2" and; (2) questioned
whether the state action imposed by the prison official was
mandatory or discretionary.2°' In other words, if positive law
authorized a prison official to discipline inmates without a predicate
finding of misconduct, then no state-created liberty interest in
avoiding discipline existed. This mode of analysis prompted both
inmates and judges to study intricate statutory language for the
purpose of differentiating between terms such as "may" or
"shall., 20 2
The evolution of this language-intensive methodology
apparently stemmed from dicta found in Meachum wherein the
Majority had sought to factually distinguish Wolff.203 Wolff
examined statutory language specifying flagrant misconduct as the
substantive predicate for revoking good-time credits; Meachum
interpreted a statute containing no such restrictions. In Greenholtz,
the Court accepted this distinction and ruled that Meachum
required the Court to focus on the statute regulating parole
decisions upon which the inmates' claim was based.204
a. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional
Complex: Searching Intricate Language. -In Greenholtz, the
statute at issue commanded the release of inmates to parole unless
one of four specific predicates was found.2 5  "Shall" was the
200. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11 (focusing on NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1,114 (1) (1976));
Hewitt, 460 U.S. at 463, n.1 (examining 37 PA. CODE § 95.106(2)-107(b)(2) (1978)).
201. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 10 (finding that the parole-release decision may depend
heavily on purely subjective appraisals); Hewitt, 460 U.S. at 471 (finding that Pennsylvania
had used language of "unmistakably mandatory character").
202. See Hewitt, 460 U.S. at 471-72 (finding that Pennsylvania's regulations use of "shall,"
"will," and "must" necessitated the conclusion that the state had created a liberty interest).
203. After discussing the applicability and facts of Wolff, the Meachum Court stated:
Here, Massachusetts law conferred no right on the prisoner to remain in the prison
to which he was initially assigned, defeasible only upon proof of specific acts of
misconduct. Insofar as we are advised, transfers between Massachusetts prisons
are not conditioned upon the occurrence of specified events. On the contrary,
transfer in a wide variety of circumstances is vested in prison officials. The
predicate for invoking the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment as construed
and applied in Wolff v. McDonnell is totally nonexistent in this case.
Meachum, 427 U.S. at 226-27 (Footnote omitted).
204. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 10.
205. NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1, 114 (1) (1976) required the Board of Parole to order
release unless: (1) there was a risk the inmate would fail to conform to parole conditions; (2)
release would depreciate the seriousness of the initial crime; (3) release would adversely
affect prison discipline or; 4) the inmate needed further rehabilitation. Id.
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operative word governing approval of parole.2°6 According to the
inmates' theory, absent one of these specified predicates, inmates
were guaranteed parole.c7 In addition, prisoners argued that the
statute as written created a presumption of release.2 8 The
inmates claimed that they therefore possessed a legitimate
expectation of release in the absence of one of the specified
reasons for refusal.
209
The Greenholtz Court accepted this argument, found a
protected liberty interest, and proceeded to strike the due process
balance.21" Although the Court ultimately concluded that the
process provided the inmates was constitutionally sufficient to
protect their liberty interests, 21' the opinion became a springboard
for inmates who wanted to challenge prison authority.
b. Hewitt v. Helms-A "Magic Combination of
Words". -This language-intensive methodology reached its full
fruition in 1983 when the Supreme Court decided Hewitt v.
Helms. 12 In Hewitt, an inmate who had been placed in adminis-
trative segregation and charged with misconduct in connection with
a riot, challenged the sufficiency of the procedures which were used
in his disciplinary hearing.213 The Court initially concluded that
administrative segregation was a condition that inmates could
206. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 10.
207. Id. at 12.
208. Id.
209. Id. It is important to distinguish between expectations and entitlements. In Board
of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), the Supreme Court ruled that to have a protected
interest, one "clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have
more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of
entitlement to it." Id. at 577.
Justice O'Conner believes that distinction depends on how strictly a statute regulates
the decision-maker's discretion. Only where "particularized standards or criteria" govern the
ultimate decision can an individual claim a protected liberty interest. See Connecticut Bd.
of Pardons v. Dumschat, 482 U.S. 458, 382 (1981)(O'Conner, J., dissenting).
210. See id. at 12.
211. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 26 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part).
212. 459 U.S. 461 (1983).
213. Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 462. After Helms assaulted two guards and was subdued, an
uprising erupted among the inmates at the Huntingdon state penitentiary. Inmates were
hand-cuffed to pipes after attempting to storm the control center. Several guards received
serious injuries attempting to quell the violence. Id.
A similar uprising occurred at the Huntington penitentiary in 1989. The facility, built
in 1889 to house 1,347 inmates had over 2,000 inmates when the riot ensued. See
Huntingdon, Pa., PROPRIETARY TO THE UNITED PRESS INT'L., Oct. 24, 1989, at "Regional
News."
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reasonably expect to encounter during their incarceration.214
Nevertheless, the Court held that Pennsylvania legislation created
a protected liberty interest in remaining in the general prison
population.215
The language of the Hewitt opinion suggests that the Majority
reached its decision somewhat reluctantly. First, the Court noted
that the type of deprivation which accompanies administrative
segregation is minor in comparison to the type of discipline which
could potentially lengthen an inmate's sentence.2 6 Second, the
Court denied that mere "careful procedural structure" in a statute
would create a protected liberty interest. 217  In support of its
position, the Court noted that procedural guidelines are enacted to
regulate the discretion granted to prison officials and, in light of the
history of correctional services, such efforts are largely benefi-
cial.218 Third, the Court noted an irony that is implicit in the
positivist theory itself; a state that codifies rules governing inner-
prison decision-making actually invites increased due process
litigation.2 t9 While a state that opts not to establish such rules
thereby avoids litigation while arbitrarily continuing to deny
inmates a constitutional right.22°
After close examination of the statutory language, the Court
concluded that Pennsylvania had issued more than mere guide-
lines. 22' Language of "unmistakably mandatory character"
established that certain "specified substantive predicates"222 must
occur before administrative segregation could be imposed.
Pennsylvania had therefore created a liberty interest that triggered
procedural safeguards. As in Greenholtz, however, after balancing
Pennsylvania's interest in removing an inmate who posed a security
threat with the inmate's new-found liberty interest, the Court
214. Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 468.
215. Id. at 466.
216. Id. at 470.
217. Id. at 460.
218. Id.
219. Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 271.
220. Id. See also discussion infra part V.A.
221. Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 271.
222. Id. at 271, 272. Circuit Judge Posner was skeptical of the Hewitt methodology in
Smith v. Shettle, 946 F.2d 1250 (7th Cir. 1991). Posner cautioned that "the imperative mood
as a matter of grammar is not a sine qua non of entitlement." Id. at 1253. See also
discussion infra part V.A.
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concluded that due process had been satisfied.2" The Court
ultimately held that an informal, nonadversarial evidentiary review
provided adequate protection against unwarranted administrative
segregation.224
The dissenters were infuriated with the Majority's application
of the state-created interest theory.2' The dissent scorned the
concept that a prisoner maintains only the type of state-bestowed
liberty which is created by a "magic" combination of words.
226
According to the dissent, such an approach departed from Wolff
and failed to recognize the inmate's residuum of retained liberty.
In addition, the dissenters argued that the degree of deprivation is
always a relative concept.227  Under their reasoning, although not
every inmate facing an adverse change in daily conditions can
legitimately claim a deprivation of liberty, an inmate who is facing
sufficiently severe disparate treatment risks losing what little liberty
he still retains. 21 Deprivations imposed for misconduct fall
outside of the initial sentence and pertain to separate actions.
229
According to the dissenters, an inmate's liberty is therefore
protected directly by the Due Process Clause. °
3. Assessing the Limitations of the Hewitt Approach to Liberty
Interests. -Federal courts have applied the Hewitt analysis to
223. Hewitt. 459 U.S. at 474.
224. Id. at 476.
225. Id. at 478 (Blackmum, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Id. at 479
(Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, J., Marshall, J., and Blackmum, J. for Parts II and
Ill).
226. Id. at 482.
227. Id. at 486. See also discussion infra part V.B.
228. Justice Stevens seemed to be advancing a standard for reviewing prisoners' due
process rights:
In general, if a prisoner complains of an adverse change in conditions which he
shares with an entire class of his fellow prisoners as part of the day-to-day
operations of the prison, there would be no reason to find that he has been
deprived of his constitutionally protected liberty. But if a prisoner is singled out
for disparate treatment and if the disparity is sufficiently severe, his liberty is at
stake.
Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 486 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
229. Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 487.
230. Id. at 496. Under some circumstances, an inmate retains a liberty interest that
independently triggers the Due Process Clause. For example, in Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480
(1980), the Court held that an inmate's right to be free from involuntary transfer to a mental
hospital involved a liberty interest irrespective of state regulation. Similarly, in Washington
v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990), the Court held that an inmate had a liberty interest,
independent of state law, in avoiding involuntary dosage of psychotropic drugs.
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prisoners' due process claims for over a decade. Using this analysis
often involves parsing complicated statutory language. The
grammatical gymnastics performed in search of protected liberty
interests are reflected in the decisions themselves.231 As a conse-
quence, the methodology expanded to encompass more than just
the traditional types of discipline, such as the revocation of good
time credit and solitary or administrative segregation. 32
Under Hewitt prisoners have successfully asserted liberty
interests in minor deprivations traditionally within the discretion of
the prison official. For example, in United States v. Michigan,33
the District Court for the Western District of Michigan located a
state-created liberty interest that guaranteed inmates the right to
remain free of a punitive diet of food loaf.234 Similarly, the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals held in Spruytte v. Walters235 that an
inmate possessed a liberty interest in possessing a dictionary.36
Like thousands of others, these two cases illustrate that the search
for mandatory language and state-created liberty interests was no
longer strictly tied to the issue of discipline.
Use of the Hewitt methodology spawned a number of problems
that have plagued the judiciary and prison administrators in their
interpretation of due process. In addition to the drudgery of
wading through statutory language, courts were forced to scrutinize
regulations," policy directives," and rules" in search of
231. Despite the warning in Kentucky Dept. of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454,
464, n.4 (1989), that "the mandatory language requirement is not an invitation to courts to
search regulations for any imperative that might be found," many courts have insisted on
doing just that. But see Smith, 496 F.2d at 1253.
232. See Sandin v. Connor, 115 S. Ct. at 2293, 2299-300 (1995).
233. 680 F. Supp. 270 (W.D. Mich. 1988).
234. Id.
235. 753 F.2d 498 (6th Cir. 1985).
236. Id.
237. Layton v. Beyer, 953 F.2d 839 (3d Cir. 1992) (interpreting regulations governing
placement in the Management Control Unit); Sher v. Coughlin, 739 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1984)
(interpreting regulations on placement in restrictive confinement). But see Lyon v. Farrier,
727 F.2d 766 (8th Cir. 1984) (interpreting regulations on prison jobs).
238. See, e.g., Burgin v. Nix, 899 F.2d 733 (8th Cir. 1990) (policy permitting officials to
serve "sacked" meals to incorrigible inmates did not create a liberty interest); United States
v. Michigan, 680 F. Supp. 270 (W.D. Mich. 1988) (policy directive defining types of
misbehavior for which a food loaf diet could be imposed created a liberty interest).
239. See Sultenfuss v. Snow, 35 F.3d 1494 (11th Cir. 1994) (interpreting the Georgia
parole guidelines system). Courts have held, however, that prison officials' promises are not
the kind of promises that inmates could reasonably expect to enforce. See Klos v. Haskell,
48 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 1995). As Circuit Judge Jacobs points out, if inmates were allowed to
assert interests in mere promises, then every claim would require either a jury or full
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entitlements. Inmates attempted to demand procedural protections
whenever mandatory language and specific substantive predicates
were used to limit the prison officials' discretion.2" In addressing
inmates' claims, many courts have interpreted written rules as
evidence that the state intended to create a liberty interest in favor
of inmates.241 Other courts have reasoned that states merely
meant to provide correctional employees with guidelines on how to
properly maintain a prison without trammelling on inmates'
constitutional rights.242
This methodology, as it evolved after Hewitt, has perpetuated
a terrible irony ultimately detrimental to both inmates and
individual states. States attempting to promote appropriate prison
management are frequently slapped with lawsuits.243  States
discovery and states would lose the ability to define the liberty interests as intended. But see
Connecticut Bd. of Pardons, 452 U.S. 458, 467 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring) (suggesting
that an administrative practice alone or even a mutual understanding could give rise to a
liberty interest).
240. As noted in Shango v. Jurich, 681 F.2d 1091, 1100 (7th Cir. 1982), one cannot assert
the existence of a protected liberty interest to demand needless formality. The individual
must first have a legitimate claim of entitlement to a substantive interest. Id. In addition,
without a legitimate entitlement, mere fear or hope about a future discretionary decision will
not create a liberty interest. Gaston v. Taylor, 946 F.2d 340, 344 (5th Cir. 1991).
241. This practice seems to have been fostered by the Court's holding in Hewitt that
Pennsylvania's continued use of explicitly mandatory "demands a conclusion" that the State
has created a protected liberty interest. Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 472. Professor Herman points
out that if legislators enact laws that reflect social expectations, then a law that creates a
liberty interest reflects society's view that the state should not revoke that interest unfairly.
Herman, supra note 3, at 552-554. Labelling this the "majoritarian rationale" for the
positivist theory, Herman concludes that where legislatures determine liberty interests (and,
indirectly, the need for due process) according to their own or society's values, the Due
Process Clause no longer limits state action. Id. Since the Constitution is an anti-
majoritarian document, Herman believes that state-created liberty interests are unconstitu-
tional. Similarly, courts that refuse to protect a type of liberty that society fails to value are
unfaithful to the dictates of the Constitution. According to Herman, prisoners retain the
liberty that society refuses to acknowledge. Id.
242. See Miller v. Henman, 804 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1986), reh'g denied, 484 U.S. 844
(1987). In Miller, the court held that detailed regulations did not give rise to a liberty
interest. Rather, the Attorney General had merely told "his staff how he wants to exercise
his discretion." Id. at 424. "[T]he documents guide the staff rather than the prisoners ....
[A] jailer who gives erratic and unreliable classifications may have to answer to the Attorney
General, but he does not have to answer to [the prisoner]." Id. at 427.
Similarly, in Nottingham v. Peoria, 709 F. Supp. 542 (M.D. Pa. 1988), the court found
that the Bureau of Prisoners program statements providing for single housing for chronic
hepatitis carriers where possible did not create a liberty interest; the statements were merely
to guide officials. Also, in Marshall v. Kozakiewicz, 601 F. Supp. 1549 (W.D. Pa. 1985), the
court held that a descriptive prison memorandum was meant to guide officials and that the
state had not intended to create a liberty interest.
243. GOBERT & COHEN, supra note 3, at 229.
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without such rules have avoided litigation. As a practical conse-
quence, the problem with arbitrary decision making is intensi-
fied.2" The Hewitt methodology effectively discouraged states
from codifying express guidelines for prison employees. Further-
more, since an inmate who possesses a liberty interest is entitled to
procedural protections, states with tightly cabined discretion have
had to pay for the added safeguards required for inner-prison
disciplinary proceedings.
245
Thus, by leaving prison employees with unfettered discretion,
a state could avoid both litigation and the added administrative and
fiscal burdens associated with procedural safeguards. The unfortu-
nate result is that a state with severely overcrowded prisons stands
to benefit the most by avoiding remedial prison legislation. Despite
the fact that the monarchial power of the prison official has been
the most counterproductive aspect of the prison system,24' the
Hewitt methodology arguably encouraged continued abuse.
Another pervasive problem fostered by the Hewitt analysis was
the introduction of federal court supervision over the daily
management of state prisons. 247  Daily prison administration
includes items such as intrastate and interstate transfers, classifica-
tions, administrative and disciplinary segregation, mail, library, and
visitor privileges, educational opportunities, work-release, and
vocational training.248 States with substantive prison legislation
governing these activities suddenly saw a multitude of inmates
asserting due process violations in federal court. The courts, in
turn, began monitoring the imposition of even minor disciplinary
actions. 249  The situation challenged the boundaries of federalism
244. Where there is a lack of legislative guidance instructing prison officials about
appropriate decision-making, the possibility of arbitrariness is increased. On the other hand,
where rules exist to help officials manage prisons, the risk of arbitrary decision making
theoretically decreases. Yet, should the rule create a liberty interest, the inmate receives
procedural safeguards despite the fact that the risk of arbitrary decision-making has been
diminished. Ultimately, "due process is prescribed where needed least and denied where
needed most." GOBERT & COHEN supra note 3, at 229. Gobert and Cohen believe that the
Supreme Court has failed to recognize freedom from arbitrary decision-making as an
independent liberty interest. Id.
245. See generally Friendly, supra note 64 (discussing the financial burdens imposed by
due process requirements).
246. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
247. Sandin v. Connor, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2299-2300 (1995).
248. Amicus Curiae Brief for Appellant, at 23, Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995)
(No. 93-1911) (filed by States of New Hampshire, et al.).
249. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2299-300.
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in an area where states held a very crucial interest. 250  The
inmates' state-created liberty interests as interpreted under Hewitt
almost always took precedence over the state's interest in indepen-
dent prison administration.
IV. Modifying the State-Created Liberty Interest Approach:
Sandin v. Conner
A. Background
In an opinion written by Justice Rehnquist, the United States
Supreme Court rendered its five to four ruling in Sandin v. Connor
on June 19, 1995.251 As one commentator noted, the decision
"bore the earmarks of a considerable struggle within the
Court., 252  Refusing to acknowledge a liberty interest in avoiding
disciplinary segregation, a conservative Majority seized the case as
an opportunity to accomplish a number of goals.2 53 As an exami-
nation of the facts will show, however, Sandin was a peculiar case
in which to create a new methodology for evaluating prisoners'
procedural due process claims.
254
The controversy involved a § 1983 claim 25 5 against Cinda
250. Id.
251. Id. at 2293. Court observers noted that Chief Justice Renquist had previously
expressed a keen interest in prisoners' rights cases. Linda Greenhouse, High Court,
Changing Recent Course, Makes It Harder for Prisoners to Sue, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1995,
at B7. Normally a quick writer, Rehnquist took almost four months to author the Sandin
opinion. Id. Commentators speculate whether the delay suggests that dissents formed later
as the other Justices realized that Rehnquist intended to use the facts of Sandin to produce
an opinion that significantly narrowed prisoners' procedural due process claims. Id. Note
that Rehnquist also wrote the Hewitt opinion which openly disapproved of federal courts
interfering with state prison administration. See discussion supra part Ill B.2.b.
252. Greenhouse, supra note 251, at B7. Justice Ginsburg dissented, joined by Justice
Stevens. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2302. Justice Breyer also filed a dissent joined by Justice
Souter. Id. at 2304. See discussion infra part IV.C.
253. Chief Justice Rehnquist was joined by Justices Kennedy, O'Conner, Scalia and
Thomas. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2295.
254. Greenhouse, supra note 251, at B7. See also discussion infra part IV.C.
255. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) (Supp. 1993). According to Doumar, supra note 6, at 22, Section
1983 has become a popular vehicle for state prisoners challenging the conditions of
confinement. Haled as the "watchdog on abuses of power by state officers," Section 1983
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Sandin, the Team Unit Manager of Hawaii's Halawa Correctional
Facility.2 6 DeMont Conner, an inmate serving an indeterminate
sentence of thirty years to life, charged Sandin with violating his
procedural due process rights as guaranteed under both the Due
Process Clause and Hawaii's prison regulations.2"7 The facts
revealed that an incident occurred in August of 1987 when Conner
was stripped and subjected to a body cavity search after being
escorted to a module program area. 8 Conner reacted with
"angry and foul language directed at the officer" who conducted a
rectal search.2"9 Conner was later notified that he had been
charged with "high" and "moderate" misconduct stemming from
the incident.2" Conner subsequently appeared before an adjust-
ment committee 261 that refused to honor his request to present
witnesses and ultimately judged him guilty of the alleged miscon-
duct.262 Commencing August 31, 1987, Conner served thirty days
plus eight concurrent hours of disciplinary segregation in the
Special Holding Unit (SHU).
263
allows prisoners to "teach state officers what the Constitution demands of them." Friedman,
supra note 51, at 575. Not surprisingly, "[s]tate prisoners have also become the classic § 1983
plaintiffs." Nasim, 64 F.3d at 957 (Wilkinson, Cir. J., concurring).
256. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2293. Cinda Sandin was sued in her official and individual
capacity. Conner initially sued sixteen state correctional officials. By the time the case
reached the Supreme Court only Sandin remained with respect to the procedural due process
claim. Brief for Petitioner at ii, Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995) (No. 93-1911).
257. 17 Haw. Admin. R. §§ 17-201-1 to 17-201-20 (1983).
258. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2295-2296. According to his attorney, Conner was en route to
a religious session and felt that Officer Furtado conducted the search in an "abusive and
degrading" manner. Brief for Respondent at 5, Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995)
(No. 93-1911).
259. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2296.
260. Id. Under Hawaii's regulatory scheme, using physical interference to impair a
correctional function is deemed "high misconduct." Haw. Admin. R. § 17-201-6(a) (1983).
Using abusive or obscene language and/or harassing a correctional employee constitutes
"moderate misconduct." Haw. Admin. R. § 17-201-10 (1983).
261. Under Haw. Admin. R. § 17-201-12, a prison adjustment committee convenes
whenever an inmate is accused of a serious rule violation. The committee is instructed to
"make [a] finding of guilt" where: "1) the inmate or ward admits the violation and pleads
guilty," or "2) the charge is supported by substantial evidence." The committee may convict
on proof less than substantial evidence and is permitted to "render sanctions commensurate
with the gravity of the rule and the severity of the violation." Haw. Admin. R. §§ 17-201-
18(b) (1983). The adjustment committee relied on written reports by two prison officials and
no record of the proceeding was made. Brief for the Respondent at G n.3, Sandin v.
Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995) (No. 93-1911).
262. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2296. See supra part III.B.l.b.
263. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2296.
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Conner timely sought administrative review by the deputy
administrator.2 " The deputy administrator ultimately expunged
the high misconduct charge as unsupported.265 In the meantime,
however, Conner had instituted suit against Halawa's prison
officials in the United States District Court for the District of
Hawaii.2" The District Court granted Summary Judgment in
favor of the officials.267  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit re-
versed.2" The panel of three judges determined that Hawaii's
prison regulations granted Conner a protected liberty interest in
remaining free from disciplinary segregation.269 The Ninth Circuit
also noted that there was a disputed question of fact whether
Conner had received the process due under Wolff.270
According to Hawaii Administration Rule Section 17-201-
18(b), the prison's adjustment committee is instructed to find guilt
where a misconduct charge is supported by evidence.27t  The
Ninth Circuit concluded by negative implication that if the
committee fails to find substantial evidence of guilt, discipline may
not be imposed.272 The court reasoned that Conner had a state-
created liberty interest by virtue of the "'explicitly mandatory
264. Administrative review is provided if requested within fourteen (14) days of the
receipt of the adjustment committee's decision. Haw. Admin. R. § 17-201-20(a) (1983).
265. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2296. The majority opinion in Sandin notes twice that the high
misconduct charge was expunged and would not affect Connor's chances at parole. Id. at
2301, 2302 n.10. The dissenters fault this conclusion, arguing that "hindsight cannot tell us
whether a liberty interest existed at the outset." Id. at 2303 n.1.
266. Id. at 2296. The parties argued various claims in the district court for two years.
Conner was granted a preliminary injunction guaranteeing continued access to the prison law
library. See Brief for Respondent at 8, Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995) (No. 93-
1911).
267. The district court approved a Magistrate's recommendation in favor of the Prison
Officials' Motion for Summary Judgement on September 30, 1991. Brief for Respondent at
9, Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995) (No. 93-1911).
268. Conner v. Sakai, 15 F.3d 1463, 1468 (9th Cir. 1993). The Ninth Circuit opinion
addressed Conner's other claims including punishment in violation of his First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights for praying aloud in Arabic, denial of access to legal
materials, lack of meaningful review of his confinement, restricted access to written prison
rules, subjection to unconstitutional segregation and maximum custody program, the
invalidity of the program as behavior modification, and harassment with excessive minor
misconduct warnings. Id. at 1463. Conner represented himself before the district court and
the Ninth Circuit. Brief for Respondent at 9 n.7, Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995)
(93-1911).
269. Conner, 15 F.3d at 1466.
270. Conner, 15 F.3d at 1466, 1467. See discussion supra part III.B.l.b.
271. Haw. Admin. R. § 17-201-18(b); Conner, 15 F.3d at 1466.
272. Conner, 15 F.3d at 1466.
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language' that if the substantive predicates are met, a particular
outcome must follow. ' 273  The Ninth Circuit held summary
judgment improper and remanded for further development of the
record on the issue of why Conner was denied an opportunity to
call witnesses. 27 4  The Supreme Court granted certiorari "to
reexamine the circumstances under which state prison regulations
afford inmates a liberty interest protected by the Due Process
clause.,
27 5
B. The Sandin Majority-Erecting a Legal Barrier
The Sandin Majority began its analysis by examining Wolff and
subsequent cases that defined the state-created liberty interest
approach to due process. 276 The Court noted how prison disci-
plinary cases litigated after Meachum gave rise to a new method of
defining liberty interests. 277 According to the Sandin Majority,
Greenholtz had prompted the new analysis which centered on a
"mechanical dichotomy" that differentiated between statutory
language granting prison officials mandatory or discretionary
authority over discipline.278 Reaching new heights in Hewitt, this
methodology did not require "grievous loss" as a prerequisite.279
The Majority criticized the Hewitt methodology for requiring courts
to wrangle with "often rather routine prison guidelines," when
looking for the magic mandatory language and substantive
predicates that trigger procedural safeguards.2" At worst, Hewitt
encouraged prisoners to "comb regulations in search of mandatory
language on which to base entitlements to various state-conferred
privileges."" t
Recognizing that the lower courts were flooded with prisoner
claims, the Court did not criticize application of the Hewitt
methodology.' Courts construing mandatory directives fre-
quently inferred, like the Ninth Circuit had done, that failure to
273. Id. at 1466. To find a liberty interest in the prison regulations, the Ninth Circuit
relied on the Hewitt methodology as applied in Kentucky Dep't of Corrections. Id.
274. Id. at 1468.
275. Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2295 (1995).
276. Id. at 2297.
277. Id. at 2298.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2298.
281. Id. at 2299.
282. Id. at 2299.
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meet the statutory conditions precluded a finding of guilt.8 The
Sandin Majority stressed, however, that statutes governing the
prison context required a more sensitive interpretation. 8  The
Majority recognized that state legislatures enact positive law to
guide prison administration.285 As such, the laws are not meant
to confer liberty interests on inmates.86  In the opinion of the
Majority the Hewitt methodology had unfortunately been applied
by lower federal courts to find and protect liberty interests in
avoiding trivial deprivations."
To the Majority, the Hewitt methodology had two undesirable
effects. First, states were reluctant to codify guidelines for prison
management for fear of creating liberty interests that invited
litigation. 8 Supreme Court precedent under Hewitt actually
militated against written standards, even though guidelines were
sorely needed to moderate prison officials' unbridled discretion.2 9
Second, use of the Hewitt methodology drew federal courts
into daily prison administration.2" The traditional leeway given
283. Id. As the Supreme Court pointed out, the Court of Appeals did not hold that a
determination of guilt was precluded without evidence to support the charge. Id. Instead,
the Ninth Circuit found a liberty interest and held that Wolff required due process before
that interest could be deprived. Conner, 15 F.3d at 1466. In Sandin, the Court called this
type of reasoning "negative implication jurisprudence," and blamed the confusion among the
lower courts on Hewitt. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2299.
284. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2299.
285. Id.
286. Id. See discussion supra part III.B.3., noting that one of the prevailing problems
with the theory of state-created liberty interests is the anomaly between what is intended by
the legislature and what is ultimately interpreted as a liberty interest by the courts. Many
states began to put disclaimers in their regulations stating that no liberty interests were
thereby created. See e.g., Sultenfuss v. Snow, 35 F.3d 1494, 1497 n.2 (1994).
287. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2299-300.
288. Id. at 2299.
289. Id. The Sandin majority opined:
Prison administrators need to be concerned with the safety of the staff and inmate
population. Ensuring that welfare often leads prison administrators to curb the
discretion of staff on the front line who daily encounter prisoners hostile to the
authoritarian structure of the prison environment. Such guidelines are not set
forth solely to benefit the prisoner. They also aspire to instruct subordinate
employees how to exercise discretion vested by the State in the warden, and to
confine the authority of prison personnel in order to avoid widely different
treatment of similar incidents. The approach embraced by Hewitt discourages this
desirable development: States may avoid creation of "liberty" interests by having
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prison officials in maintaining order inside the country's prisons had
been usurped by the courts. As a result, prisoner litigation
inundated the judicial system. Valuable resources were being spent
on cases with limited public benefit.291 The Majority cited a
string of lower court cases finding liberty interests in the context of
seemingly trivial deprivations.2" The Majority then stated that
courts should give great deference to prison officials' decisions
made in the process of managing the volatile prison environment.
To the Majority, the Hewitt approach had "strayed from the
real concerns undergirding the liberty protected by the Due Process
Clause."2 93  Accordingly, the Court decided to return to the
analysis that had been established in Wolff and correctly applied in
Meachum. 294 The Court asserted in a footnote that abandonment
of the Hewitt methodology did not require 'overruling precedent295
because recent opinions utilizing that approach had either failed to
find a liberty interest or had held that sufficient process had been
afforded.296 The Majority instead abandoned the Hewitt approach
as. "difficult to administer and produc[tive] of anomalous re-
suIts."
297
Citing Wolff, the Court held that, under the new analysis,
states could still create liberty interests but only in certain circum-
stances.298 Thus:
291. Id. Judicial resources are being stretched to cover the influx of prisoner cases.
According to Doumar, every federal circuit has had to increase its centralized research staff
to deal with the multitude of prisoner petitions. Doumar, supra note 7, at 28. As a result,
non-judicial staff are handling many of the inmate cases. Id. Doumar states, "[ilt appears
that the handling of prisoner petitions is becoming a judgeless system. Many prisoner
complaints never receive more than a cursory review from a federal judge at either the
district or appellate level. Meritorious prisoner civil rights cases will continue to be buried
unless the deluge of prisoner cases can be stopped." Id. at 30-31.
292. This list of cases reveals the Court's overall frustration with the explosion of prisoner
litigation. According to the Sandin majority, Hewitt spawned litigation challenging trivial
matters which have been traditionally under administrative control. Among others, the
Court pointed to: Klos v. Haskell, 48 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 1995) (claiming a liberty interest in the
right to participate in "shock program"); Segal v. Biller, 1994 WL 594705 (9th Cir. 1994)
(claiming liberty interest in waiver of travel limit for prison furloughs); Burgin v. Nix, 899
F.2d 733 (8th Cir. 1990) (claiming liberty interest in receiving a tray lunch rather than a
"sack lunch"). Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2299-2300.
293. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2300.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 2300 n.5.
296. Id. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238,245-46 (1983); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S.
461, 477 (1983).
297. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2300 n.5.
298. Id. at 2300.
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These interests will be generally limited to freedom from
restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an
unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the-Due
Process Clause of its own force, non-the-less imposes atypical
and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the
ordinary incidents of prison life.' 99
This language has the practical effect of erecting a legal barrier to
prisoners' procedural due process claims.3" It encapsulates the
Court's latest approach to state-created liberty interests.
The Court also rejected Conner's assertion that punitive state
action would always trigger the Due Process Clause.30 ' Although
Conner's solitary confinement was imposed for punishment, the
Court found that solitary confinement was not "a dramatic
departure from the basic conditions of [his] indeterminate sen-
tence."3 2 The issue of whether disciplinary confinement in and
of itself implicated a liberty interest was not before the Court.
30 3
Under the Majority's new test, therefore, Conner's segregated
confinement did not impose an "atypical, significant deprivation"
for which state law could create a liberty interest.
3°4
So ruling, the Court pointed to two factors that influenced its
decision. First, the daily living conditions of inmates in administra-
tive segregation or protective custody did not differ significantly
299. Id.
300. Courts construing Sandin have noted the impact of this language. Harper v. Young,
95, 164 F.3d 563, 564 (10th Cir. 1995) (Sandin "markedly narrowed the range of circumstanc-
es that will give rise to state-created liberty interest"). See also, Peter Morrison, The New
Chain Gang, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 21, 1995, at Al. (noting that Sandin erodes long-established
prisoners' rights standards).
301. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2300.
302. Id. at 2301.
303. Id. at 2301.
304. Id. Since the Court applied the rule announced in Sandin to the facts and the
parties before it, Sandin applies retroactively to pending cases. See Harper v. Virginia Dept.
of Taxation, 113 S. Ct. 2510 (1993) (a federal rule of law applies retroactively once the
Supreme Court applies it to the case currently before it).
A large number of inmate due process claims were dismissed following Sandin. See
e.g., Turnstall v. Beck, No. 94-17014, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 24583 (9th Cir. Aug. 22, 1995)
(finding that administrative segregation does not impose an atypical, significant deprivation
in which a state can create a liberty interest); Farley v. McCroy, No. 94-3014, 1995 U.S. App.
LEXIS 19478 (7th Cir. July 21, 1995) (finding that denial of educational opportunities does
not impose an atypical and significant deprivation); Sivak v. Mutch, No. 93-36014, 1995 U.S.
App. LEXIS 27861 (9th Cir. Sept. 25, 1995) (affirming summary judgment based on the




from the living conditions of inmates in disciplinary segrega-
tion. 5 Therefore Conner's disciplinary segregation was not
harsher than the type of segregation over which prison officials
have complete control."6 Under the new analysis, therefore,
Conner's segregation was not "atypical." Second, the Court noted
that Conner's record had been expunged of the high misconduct
charge.3 7 These two factors suggested that a thirty day period of
segregation did not "work a major change in [Conner's] environ-
ment."3 °8 Moreover, the Majority differentiated Conner's situa-
tion from those where state action would impact the inmate's
overall sentence.3°" Unlike revocation of good-time credits or
parole, the fact that Conner had been disciplined for misconduct
did not necessarily translate into parole denial under Hawaii's
regulatory scheme.310 Likening Conner's argument to the one
defeated in Meachum, the Court stated, "The chance that a finding
of misconduct will alter the balance is simply too attenuated to
invoke the procedural guarantees of the Due Process Clause."
311
In short, the Court held:
that neither the Hawaii prison regulation in question, nor the
Due Process Clause itself, afforded Conner a protected liberty
interest that would entitle him to the procedural protections set
forth in Wolff. The regime to which he was subjected as a result
of the misconduct hearing was within the normal range of
confinement to be normally expected for one serving an
indeterminate term of 30 years to life.312
C. Two Sets of Sandin Dissenters
Two strong dissents followed the Majority opinion.313 In the
first dissent, Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Stevens, concluded




309. Id. at 2302.
310. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2302.
311. Id.
312. Id. In a footnote directly after the holding, the Court recognized that prisoners
retain other Constitutional rights through which they may still challenge arbitrary state
action. In addition, prisoners can utilize any existing internal prison grievance procedures
as well as judicial review by the state. Id. at 2302 n.11.
313. Ginsburg joined by Stevens comprised the first dissent. Id. at 2302. Breyer joined
by Souter comprised the second dissent. Id. at 2304.
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that Conner had a liberty interest protected directly by the Due
Process Clause.3t 4 Since punitive disciplinary segregation stigma-
tizes prisoners and can diminish their parole opportunities,
Ginsburg and Stevens found that Conner had suffered a "severe
alteration in the conditions of his incarceration., 315 In addition,
they faulted the Court for comparing administrative and protective
custody with disciplinary segregation.316 While the former types
of custody can be imposed for security reasons, the latter presup-
poses misconduct.
317
Ginsburg and Stevens also accused the Court of erroneously
considering the fact that Conner's high misconduct charge was
ultimately expunged.318 Arguing that "hindsight cannot tell us
whether a liberty interest existed at the outset," they rejected the
Majority's "all's well that ends well" approach. 319 To avoid the
imposition of arbitrary discipline, Conner needed procedural
safeguards prior to being subjected to disciplinary confinement.
Although the high misconduct charge was ultimately expunged, it
did little to make up for the time he spent in solitary confinement.
The fairness dictated by the Due Process Clause does not occur
where the necessary procedural safeguards postdate the imposition
of punishment.
Citing the Due Process Clause as the "wellspring of Conner's
protected liberty interest,''3' Ginsburg and Stevens proceeded to
challenged, the entire theory of state-created liberty interests on
two grounds. Their first argument exposed the -ironic result
produced by the theory itself: when state law is seen as the source
of protected liberty, inmates may have greater liberty in some
states than in others. 321 To these dissenters, this anomaly under-
mines the fundamental liberty enshrined in the Due Process
Clause.3" Their second argument suggested that the positivist
theory allowed states without restrictive legislation to guide
correctional officers to avoid judicial scrutiny. Thus, "An incentive
314. Id. at 2302.
315. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2302.
316. Id.
317. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
318. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2303 n.1.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 2303.
321. Id. See also supra note 187.
322. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2303.
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for ruleless prison management disserves the State's penological
goals and jeopardizes the welfare of prisoners." 32
Ginsburg and Stevens found that recognizing a liberty interest
directly protected by the Due Process Clause would have solved
these problems. 324 In fact, since a request for witnesses is proper-
ly denied for irrelevance, lack of necessity, or threat to security, a
remand to the District Court may have shown that Conner was not
denied due process.3" Yet, under the Court's new standard of
"atypical and significant deprivation," Conner was not given an
opportunity to demonstrate that he was denied due process.
In addition, Ginsburg and Stevens warned that the Majority's
new standard threatened the law with uncertainty.326 By failing
to define what kind of deprivation could qualify as "atypical and
significant," the Court left the judiciary, lawyers and inmates alike
guessing which claims would be able to cross this initial legal
barrier327
In the second dissent, Justice Breyer joined by Justice Souter
questioned the Court's interpretation of relevant precedent. 32 To
Breyer and Souter the issue presented was "whether Conner's
particular punishment amounted to a deprivation of 'liberty' within
the meaning of the Due Process Clause., 32 9 These two Justices
thought that the facts showed Conner had indeed experienced a
"fairly major change" in his normal living conditions. 330  They
accordingly concluded that the Ninth Circuit correctly interpreted
precedent to find that Hawaii's regulations created a liberty
interest.31  Although the Majority did not disagree with the
Ninth Circuit's reading of the law, it sought to clarify how lower
courts should interpret precedent in order to reject trivial inmate
claims.332 Breyer and Souter noted that the net result of the
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 2303-04. The disciplinary committee had relied in part on Conner's own
admissions. Therefore, unless Conner could show a genuine issue of material fact, a renewed
motion for summary judgment at the district court level would defeat his claim. See FED.
R. Civ. P. 56.
326. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2303 n.2.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 2305-06.
329. Id. at 2304.
330. Id. at 2305.
331. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2306.
332. Id.
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Majority's agenda was a complete redefinition of what constitutes
a liberty interest in the prison context as a matter of law.333
Breyer and Souter ultimately questioned the Majority's
intentions. Uncertain whether the new standard was meant to
"radically" change prior law, they prophesied that lower courts
would struggle with this rather amorphous standard.3" In addi-
tion, Breyer and Souter suggested that revision of the law was not
necessary merely to change its focus.335 The Majority's overall
objective apparently was to avoid due process claims which
challenged only trivial deprivations. Breyer and Souter argued that
simply instructing the lower courts to apply precedent in light of
this basic underlying purpose would significantly reduce the number
of such claims.336
Breyer and Souter noted three basic flaws with the Court's
new standard. First, there remains a category of liberty interests in
the prison context which will directly trigger application of the Due
Process Clause.337 In addition, there are deprivations that clearly
do not warrant procedural protections. Thus, a broad middle
category remains.3 ' Only difficult and subjective measurements
can pinpoint the category within which any particular deprivation
belongs. The new standard requires lower courts to guess at the
proper category.
Second, Breyer and Souter noted several important reasons
why state law must be considered when defining liberty interests in
the prison context.339 If state law cabins discretionary power to
impose a particular deprivation, this may suggest that the "the
333. Id. at 2306.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 2306. Justice Souter stated:
[T]here is no need, however, for a radical reading of this standard, nor any other
significant change in present law, to achieve the majority's basic objective, namely
to read the Constitution's Due Process Clause to protect inmates against
deprivations of freedoms that are important, not comparatively insignificant.
Id. at 2306.
336. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2306. Breyer concluded:
[R]ather, in my view, this concern simply requires elaborating, and explaining, the
Court's present standards (without radical revision) in order to make clear that
courts must apply them in light of the purposes they were meant to serve. As so
read, the standards will not create procedurally protected "liberty" interests where
only minor matters are at stake.
Id.
337. Id. at 2306.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 2306-07.
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matter is more likely to have played an important role in the life
of the inmate. ''31 In addition, inmates may have justifiably relied
on such laws to protect them from deprivation where they have
maintained good behavior.34' Furthermore, Breyer and Souter
argued that the existence of "cabined discretion" in state law could
help lower courts differentiate between trivial and significant
deprivations.341 State law generally tends to protect inmates
against significant deprivations of liberty. Therefore it is not
altogether unreasonable to search state law for mandatory
language. 43
Third, Breyer and Souter posited that lower courts are
thoroughly capable of distinguishing unimportant deprivations from
those which implicate traditional concepts of liberty.3" Regula-
tions governing only minor deprivations are readily identifiable.34
For example, a regulation that merely instructs the prison official
how to perform his job does not guarantee an inmate a correspond-
ing right.3' Furthermore, the Supreme Court has never held that
trivial deprivations trigger procedural safeguards. Accordingly, the
Court need only clarify that trivial deprivations are undeniably
within the scope of an inmate's initial sentence.347 With such
guidance, the lower courts could easily identify and dismiss trivial
claims.
Like Ginsburg and Stevens, Breyer and Souter concluded that
Conner had suffered a significant deprivation triggering the need
340. Id. at 2307.
341. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2307.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 2308.
345. Id.
346. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2308. This point is easily understood by the example provided
in Colon v. Schneider, 899 F.2d 660, 668 (7th Cir. 1990), where the court held that rules
governing the use of mace to subdue inmates was directed at the officials only.
347. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2308. Justice Stevens noted that lower courts have been able
to differentiate between major.and trivial deprivations. The Twomey court stated:
This does not mean, however, that every decision by prison officials should be
subject to judicial review or that courts rather than the experienced administrators
should write prison regulations. Morrissey reminds us that due process is a
flexible concept which takes account of the importance of the interests at stake;
thus, it is abundantly clear that a myriad of problems of prison administration
must remain beyond the scope of proper judicial concern. Only significant
deprivations of liberty raise constitutional issues under Morrissey.
United States v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701, 713 (7th Cir. 1973).
[Vol. 100:4
PRISONERS' DUE PROCESS CLAIMS
for procedural protections.348 They also commented that Conner
may have received all of the process necessary to protect his liberty
interest.349  Breyer and Souter reasoned that process is only
required where there is relevant factual dispute.35" The disciplin-
ary committee's record documented that the determination of guilt
rested on Conner's own admissions. 35 1 Unless Conner could show
the existence of other relevant evidence, his request for witnesses
was properly denied. Thus, these two Justices concluded that the
requirement of a relevant factual dispute meant that Conner had
already faced the preliminary legal barrier that weeds out meritless
claims.
352
Both of these very persuasive dissents suggest that Conner had
probably received all of the process due under the circumstanc-
es.353  If that is true, then the Majority arguably chose a weak
case in which to introduce a new legal barrier to prisoners'
procedural due process claims. 3 4 The Court was almost certainly
reacting to the current outcry against prisoner litigation. By raising
the threshold for claims demanding due process in connection with
inner-prison disciplinary hearings, the Sandin Majority probably
intended to avoid the vast majority of such claims.
3 5
In response to lower court decisions holding that state law
guaranteed inmates a liberty interest in avoiding minor depriva-
tions, the Sandin Majority narrowed the circumstances under which
a state can legitimately create protected liberty interests for its
inmates. 5 6  In focusing on the application of Supreme Court
precedent to inmates suffering minor deprivations traditionally
associated with incarceration, the Majority abandoned a method
predominately preoccupied with statutory language for a method
that focuses instead on the nature of the deprivation.
348. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2309.
349. Id. at 3310.
350. Id. at 2310. See also FED. R. CIv. P. 56.
351. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2310.
352. Id. at 2310. The dissent noted that the record did not specify what Conner's witness
would have offered. Id.
353. Id. at 2303-04 (Ginsburg J. and Stevens, J., dissenting); Id. at 2310 (Breyer, J. and
Souter, J., dissenting).
354. See generally, Greenhouse, supra note 251, at B71 ("[a] puzzling aspect of the
decision was that the dissenters made clear that, in their view, [Conner] had an extremely
weak case at best").
355. One can infer this from the reasoning of the majority and the overall tenure of the
opinion.
356. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. 2300.
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The new standard requires a legal determination as to whether
an inmate suffered "atypical and significant" deprivation as a result
of state action. 7  Judges looking to the facts of Sandin for
guidance may focus on prisoners generally as opposed to assessing
the impact of a particular deprivation on an individual prisoner. In
addition, since the Sandin Majority stressed that incarceration by
definition presupposes deprivation,3 8 many punishments routinely
imposed on inmates will escape judicial scrutiny. Without the
threat of judicial disapproval, arbitrary and harmful deprivations
will most likely persist. All in all, Sandin promises to have a
drastic impact on both prisoner litigation and prison administration.
V. Sandin-Foreseeable Consequences
A. Positive Results: Removing the Disincentive to Codify Prison
Guidelines
For the past two decades prisoner litigation provided a
constant source of cases allowing the Supreme Court to perfect its
theory of state-created liberty interests.359 As cases arose, the
Supreme Court constantly modified its approach.3" The initial
focus on state law as a source of liberty interests evolved into a
complex analysis that placed a high premium on restrictive
statutory language.36" As noted in Sandin, this increased concern
with statutory language departs significantly from the traditional
role of the Due Process Clause as the protector of fundamental
liberty.
362
Forced to focus on grammatical distinctions, lower courts
which practiced "negative implication jurisprudence" often wound
up protecting inmates against the type of discipline normally
associated with incarceration. A state's effort to limit the sovereign
authority of prison officials actually facilitated prisoner litiga-
tion. 3  By failing to differentiate between laws governing the
imposition of major and minor deprivations, the lower courts
357. Id.
358. Id. at 2301. "Discipline by prison officials in response to a wide range of misconduct
falls within the expected parameters of the sentence imposed by a court of law." Id.
359. See discussion supra part II.
360. See discussion supra parts II and III.
361. See discussion supra part III.B.2.b.
362. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2300.
363. See discussion supra part III.B.3.
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frequently defeated the state's underlying purpose in enacting
remedial prison legislation. By redefining the circumstances that
permit states to legitimately create liberty interests for prisoners,
Sandin ensures that prisoner litigation will be limited to state laws
that explicitly intend to protect inmates.3"
The Sandin decision addressed a number of problems with the
law as it existed after Hewitt. Instead of wrangling with intricate
statutory language for every claim, Sandin instructs judges to
examine positive laws only where state action threatens to greatly
alter the inmate's daily living conditions.3" Where an inmate is
threatened with a relatively minor deprivation such as a change in
diet, judges need not interpret ordinary rules of prison manage-
ment.
366
Inmates and states alike will benefit by the Court's retreat
from a language-intensive methodology. By removing the disincen-
tive fostered by a fear of prisoner litigation, Sandin encourages
states to establish rules governing prison administration.3 67 Such
rules will tend to alleviate the pervasive problem with prison
officials' unfettered discretion. Although prison regulations will no
longer guarantee prisoners' liberty interests in avoiding discipline,
inmates profit where numerous rules shield them from arbitrary
treatment.
368
Sandin also addresses the problems associated with the
astronomical number of prisoner claims currently flooding the
federal court docket. Sandin's legal barrier is apparently designed
to ensure that claims challenging the type of minor deprivation
traditionally associated with incarceration are either never brought
or are quickly dismissed at the District Court level. Under Sandin,
when a judge makes a legal determination that the particular
deprivation is not "atypical or significant," the due process balance
is avoided.369 It is certain that many claims will fail this initial
test thereby preserving the judicial resources frequently squandered
on borderline cases.
364. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. 2293.
365. Id. at 2301.
366. Id. at 2300 (citing United States v. Michigan, 680 F. Supp. 270 (WD Mich. 1988)).
367. See discussion supra part IV.B.
368. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
369. Under Sandin, a state-created liberty interest cannot exist unless the deprivation
poses an "atypical and significant" hardship. Under the two-step due process analysis, where
the requisite liberty interest is not found, the due process balance is unnecessary and the
government's interests prevail. See discussion supra part IV.B
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In the months following the Sandin decision, courts dismissed
hundreds of claims that failed to overcome the legal barriers
erected in Sandin.37° In Rimmer-Bey v. Brown,371 for example,
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that placement in
administrative segregation did not pose an "atypical and significant
deprivation."372  Likewise, in Smith v. Scruton,373  the Ninth
Circuit held that twenty eight days of disciplinary segregation no
longer implicated a protected liberty interest.374 These two cases
and hundreds of others illustrate that courts are using the Sandin
standard as a sword to cut back on prisoner litigation.
Another positive result occurs when the amount of prisoner
litigation is reduced. With claims challenging trivial deprivations
locked out of the system, meritorious claims based on major
deprivation and arbitrary prison administration can be more readily
370. In light of Sandin, courts have ruled that the following forms of discipline do not
impose an "atypical and significant" hardship: Black v. Coughlin, No. 95-2698, 1996 U.S.
App. LEXIS 6192 (2d Cir. Apr. 1, 1996) (full restraints and strip frisk); McClellan v.
Wilkinson, No. 95-3463, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 5482 (6th Cir. Feb. 7, 1996) (disciplinary
segregation); McCright v. Borg, No. 95-16653, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 5266 (9th Cir. Feb. 27,
1996 ) (inter-state transfer); Olatunji v. Debruyn, No. 94-3702, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 4843
(7th Cir. Feb. 27, 1996) (transfer to substantially adverse conditions); McCarthy v. Teta, No.
95-2090, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 4512 (2d Cir, Mar. 14, 1996) (denial of transfer request);
Hartsfield v. Mayer, No. 95-1411, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 3496 (6th Cir. Feb. 1, 1996) (upper
food slot restrictions and nutra-loaf diet); Dupard v. Kringle, CA No. 92-35195, 1996 U.S.
App. LEXIS 3365 (9th Cir. Feb. 9, 1996) (transfer of inmate without his legal materials);
Mitchell v. Simonet, No. 95-1355, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 3440 (10th Cir. Feb. 28, 1996)
(failure to provide hygiene products and daily showers); Martin v. Upchurch, No. 93-16907,
1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 27519 (9th Cir. Sept. 22, 1995) (termination from prison job);
Matthews v. Duckworth, No. 94-3047, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 24048 (7th Cir. Aug. 22, 1995)
(reclassification and denial of earned good-time credits); Farley v. McCroy, No. 94-3014, 1995
U.S. App. LEXIS 19478 (7th Cir. July 21,1995) (revocation of educational program); Benton
v. Keane, No. 93 Civ. 3961 (JSR), 1996 U.S. Dist LEXIS 3920 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 1996) (9
days, 5 hours in administrative confinement); Ghana v. United States, No. 93-3299-RDR,
1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3727 (Dist. Kansas Mar. 5, 1996) (inspection of prisoner mail prior
to mailing); McGee v. Allen, No. 95 C 7089, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3164 (N.D I11. Mar. 14,
1996) (having cells searched before assignment); Hendricks v. Centanni, No. 92 Civ. 5353
(SAS), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1662 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 1996) (thirty days keeplock); Rivera
v. Coughlin, No. 92 Civ. 3404 (DLC), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 560 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 1996)
(eighty-nine days keeplock); Rosario v. Selsky, No. 94 Civ. 6872 (MBM), 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19175 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 1995) (eighty-five days in SHU); Carter v. Carriero, 905 F.
Supp. 99 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) (270 days SHU).
371. 62 F.3d 789 (6th Cir. 1995).
372. Id. See also, Orellana v. Kyle, 65 F.3d 29, 32 n.2 (5th Cir. 1995) ("[it is unlikely,
however, that administrative segregation can give rise to any constitutional claim after
Sandin").
373. 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 27667 (9th Cir. 1995).
374. Id. at *5.
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identified and entertained. Inmates who have suffered blatant
procedural due process violations in connection with inner-prison
disciplinary proceedings now stand a better chance of having their
rights vindicated.375
Sandin also encourages federal courts to avoid micro-manage-
ment of state prisons.37 6  Since federal courts are now limited to
claims based on significant deprivations, states can reclaim control
over their own prison systems. Sandin respects state sovereignty
and recognizes the state's fundamental interest in being able to
discipline inmates when security so demands. 77  Given the
nation's current crisis with overcrowded prisons, it is critical to
maintain control over both the inmates and-the prison officials.
3 78
In order to promote prison security and authority, inmates who
violate prison rules must be punished swiftly.3 79 At the same
time, to avoid the resentment and mistrust that frequently sparks
violence against prison guards, states must be able to promulgate
rules to protect inmates against the arbitrary exercise of official
power. By permitting a wide range of disciplinary tactics to escape
judicial scrutiny while encouraging states to promulgate rules,
Sandin may reflect a successful accommodation of competing
interests. The Sandin approach, however, is not without its flaws.
B. Sandin: Yet Another Unworkable Approach?
Over the last three decades prisoners fought to gain judicial
recognition of their constitutional rights.3" The state-created
375. Judge Doumar made the identical argument when he advocated solutions to reduce
the number of prisoner civil rights claims which "have had the effect of denying meritorious
prisoner claims of the attention they deserve. Changes must be made to reduce the tidal
wave of meritless prisoner civil rights suits in the federal court; only then will meritorious
claims receive adequate consideration." Doumar, supra note 6, at 38.
376. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2299-2300.
377. See discussion supra note 26 and accompanying text.
378. See discussion supra parts II and III.
379. In Meachum, dissenting Justice Stevens summarized the state's interest in effective
control:
To supervise and control its prison population, the State must retain the power to
change the conditions for individuals, or groups of prisoners, quickly and without
judicial review. In many respects the State's problems in governing its inmate
population are comparable to those encountered in governing a military force.
Prompt and unquestioning obedience by the individual, even to commands he does
not understand, may be essential to the preservation of order and discipline.
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 234 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
380. See discussion supra part II.
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liberty approach initially allowed prisoners to challenge many facets
of daily prison administration under the rubric of procedural due
process. Sandin, however, effectively bars prisoners from asserting
procedural due process claims unless the threatened discipline will
greatly alter their daily living conditions.
381
The Sandin decision poses a number of problems which may
actually require additional litigation for clarification purposes. For
example, the Sandin Majority's stated intention was to return to the
state-created liberty approach utilized in Wolff and Meachum.
3 2
Courts relying on these two cases for guidance tend to search
positivist law for liberty interests only when a threatened depriva-
tion implicates a fundamental liberty such as that associated with
early release or parole. Recall that both Wolff and Meachum
discussed application of the state-created liberty interests only
where an inmate's interest in being released from prison at an
earlier date was at stake.383  As a result, the Sandin Majority's
stated intention to return to the prior mode of analysis is mislead-
ing in two respects.
First, neither Wolff nor Meachum assessed liberty interests
with a standard as stringent as Sandin's new "atypical and signifi-
cant" deprivation standard.3 s Second, because Sandin did not
explicitly overrule Hewitt, the relevance of state law is ob-
scured.3 15  Although under Sandin states are still permitted to
create liberty interests in certain circumstances, the opinion fails to
clarify the role of state law in establishing a valid liberty interest.
Subsequent case law will only serve to compound the problem. 86
381. See supra notes 357-58 and accompanying text.
382. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2300.
383. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 545 (1974); Meachum, 427 U.S. 215, 226 (1976).
384. Professor Schwartz noted that the Sandin standard:
... is not exactly a return to the Wolff-Meachum era. During that regime,
prisoners' liberty interests could stem from the [D]ue [P]rocess [C]lause (if not
within the normal range of restraints imposed by the sentence), or by state law,
but there was no requirement that the restraints pursuant to state law had to
impose an "atypical and significant hardship on the inmate..
Schwartz, supra note 18, at 7.
385. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2300 n.5. Courts are already confused about the status of pre-
Sandin precedent. E.g., Bulger v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 65 F.3d 48, 50 (5th Cir.
1995) (noting that Sandin "did not instruct on the correct methodology for determining when
prison regulations create a protected property interest").
386. See Samuels v. Mockry, 77 F.3d 34, 37-38 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting that it is "unclear
to what extent the Sandin analysis confers a liberty interest on inmates subject to a state
regulation that has been held under the Hewitt line of cases to confer no liberty interest in
the first place").
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Courts have already encountered difficulties interpreting
positive law in light of Sandin. The Second Circuit recently noted
that Sandin threatens the "continuing viability of our cases holding
that New York regulations afford inmates a liberty interest in
remaining free from administrative segregation."3" In addition,
the Tenth Circuit warned that deciding whether cases construing
state-created liberty interests under pre-Sandin law are still viable
is "no small difficulty.' 3" 8
Given the Supreme Court's current stance that many depriva-
tions are rightfully contemplated within the scope of the initial
sentence, many inmates will be unable to cross Sandin's initial
hurdle. The "atypical and significant" deprivation standard is
virtually unattainable since prisoners are already dominated by
state control.3 9
Another troubling aspect of the Sandin decision is its virtual
failure to examine liberty interests which directly invoke the Due
Process Clause. As many critics point out, it is hard to fathom
what kind of deprivation will qualify as "atypical and significant"
without directly triggering the protections of the Due Process
Clause itself.39°  As the Fifth Circuit noted in Orellana v.
Kyle,391 "[i1t is difficult to see that any other deprivations in the
prison context, short of those that clearly impinge on the duration
of confinement, will henceforth qualify for constitutional 'liberty'
status."3"
387. Rodriguez v. Phillips, 66 F.3d 470, 480 (2d Cir. 1995).
388. Harper v. Young, 64 F.3d 563, 564 (9th Cir. 1995).
389. See supra note 357-58. Inmates have been able to assert "atypical and significant"
hardships under Sandin in a few extreme cases: Long v. Hanks, No. 95-2594, 1996 U.S. App.
LEXIS 4782 (7th Cir. Mar. 4, 1996) (seven instances of loss of good-time credits and change
in credit class where length of sentence was extended as a result); Williams v. Benjamin, 77
F.3d 756 (4th Cir. 1996) (confinement in four-point restraints poses); Lee v. Coughlin, 902
F. Supp. 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (376 days in SHU); Zamakshari v. Dvoskin, 899 F. Supp. 1097
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (two years SHU and loss of good-time credits). See also Tyheem v. Allah,
No. 95-2662, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 4384 (2d Cir. Mar. 8, 1996) (assuming without deciding
that 120 days in disciplinary confinement was atypical); Loomis v. Rentie, No. 94-35820, 1995
U.S. App. LEXIS 21599 (9th Cir. July 31, 1995) (remanding for factfinding with the
instruction that "arbitrary denial of all visitation for an extended period possibly could...
amount to the imposition of an atypical and significant hardship").
390. Professor Schwartz reasons that a deprivation which causes "atypical and significant"
hardship would directly trigger the Due Process Clause. Schwartz, supra note 18, at 8. If
so, the state-created liberty interest would be superfluous. Id.
391. 65 F.3d 29 (5th Cir. 1995).
392. Id. at 31-32.
1996]
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
Perhaps the greatest flaw of the Sandin decision is the
Majority's failure to define what "atypical and significant" means
in the prison context.393 It is unknown whether the "atypical and
significant" standard is to be objectively or subjectively applied. 94
Arguably, the degree of change that a particular discipline would
cause in an individual inmate's daily living conditions largely
depends on the length of that inmate's sentence. The Majority's
feeble attempt to define the standard in terms of "the ordinary
incidents of prison life" does little to clarify the ambiguity.39 In
reality, an inmate serving a lesser sentence may face a discipline
which would be "atypical" for him but "typical" for inmates serving
indeterminate life sentences. Thirty days spent in solitary confine-
ment is potentially a greater deprivation to an inmate serving three
years than to an inmate imprisoned for life.396 Similarly, Sandin
fails to consider the impact of a given method of discipline on the
particular individual. Thirty days in solitary confinement for
prisoner X may be ten times more harmful than loss of good
credits. In order to further successful rehabilitation of the
individual, the impact of a particular discipline must be assessed
subjectively.
By failing to define the new standard's dimensions, the Sandin
decision invites litigation over the meaning of the terms "atypical
and significant." This is an ironic result considering that the Sandin
Majority intended its new standard to reduce prisoner litiga-
tion.397 Litigation will similarly be necessary to establish the
proper framework for assessing the degree of deprivation as it
pertains to the individual inmate affected.
393. See discussion supra part IV.C.
394. Sandin itself may suggest an objective approach. Applying the new standard to the
facts before it, the majority stated, "[tihe regime to which [Conner] was subjected as a result
of the misconduct hearing was within the range of confinement to be normally expected for
one serving an indeterminate term of thirty years to life." Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2302 (emphasis
added). Judges looking to Sandin's facts for guidance may interpret this language to forbid
consideration of the effect of discipline on the particular inmate.
395. Sandin 115 S. Ct. at 2300.
396. Courts are already wrangling with this aspect of the Sandin decision. One court has
noted that "[tlhe impact of Sandin on cases of disciplinary confinement for a period greater
than 30 days, however, remains unclear." Zamakshari v. Dvoskin, 899 F. Supp. 1097, 1106
(S.D.N.Y. 1995). Courts are remanding to determine whether segregation for longer than
30 days can be "atypical." See also Whitford v. Captain Boglno, 63 F.3d 527 (7th Cir. 1995)
(remand to assess conditions of disciplinary confinement); Acker v. Maxwell, 61 F.3d 909
(9th Cir. 1995) (remand for determination on six months maximum isolation).
397. See discussion supra part IV.B.; supra note 290-92 and accompanying text.
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Overall, Sandin poses many potential dangers which threaten
to increase the unchecked authority of prison officials. If the Court
intends to define "ordinary incidents of prison life" generically,
inmates who suffer great personal hardship from a generally
accepted form of discipline will be denied vital procedural protecti-
ons. Such an objective assessment is contrary to the underlying
spirit of the Due Process Clause which attempts to guard the
individual against arbitrary state action.398 By reassigning to the
states the authority to discipline inmates without federal judicial
oversight, Sandin invites constitutional violations which will remain
undiscovered if the threatened discipline is one generally imposed
upon inmates. The focus of the Due Process Clause on the
individual is thereby eviscerated.
Sandin also reflects the national outcry against prisoner
litigation.39 In the wake of repeated legislative attempts to curb
prisoner litigation, the Sandin Majority appears to have introduced
a new standard for the purpose of reducing prisoner claims on the
federal court docket.' However, since the typical inmate claim
challenges the authority of prison officials on multiple grounds, the
imposition of a new standard for prisoners' procedural due process
claims will do little to halt the plethora of prisoner lawsuits.4°' As
Chief Justice Rehnquist once noted, "[t]he inmate stands to gain
something and lose nothing from a complaint stating facts that he
is ultimately unable to prove."' 2 Sandin recognizes that prison-
ers may still invoke the First and Eighth Amendments as well as
the Equal Protection Clause to insulate themselves from arbitrary
state action.' While Sandin may have some impact on the
number of prisoners' procedural due process claims, in the long run
Sandin will do little to divorce the federal judiciary from its current
position as overseer of state prison systems.
398. See discussion supra part II.B.
399. See supra note 9. See also Wesley Smith & James Wootton, Jailhouse Blues, 46
NAT. REV. 11, 40 (noting that most governors, state attorneys and other criminal justice
officials believe that the prisoners' rights movement is making state prisons ungovernable).
400. See discussion supra part IV.B.
401. Conner took seven claims to the appellate level. Conner v. Sakai, 15 F.3d 1463 (9th
Cir. 1993). See generally Doumar, supra note 6 (assessing the components of prisoner
claims).
402. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 326-327 (1972)(Renquist, J., dissenting).




Incarcerated individuals retain a residuum of fundamental
liberty that is directly protected by the Due Process Clause
contained in the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. For the last two decades, the Supreme Court has also
recognized that inmates acquire liberty interests by virtue of
positive law. Both sources have been utilized to protect inmates
from arbitrary decision-making by prison officials in the context of
inner-prison disciplinary proceedings.
Incarcerated inmates must be protected from the monarchial
power of the prison administration and the officials who enforce
the prison rules. Given the current state of the nation's overbur-
dened prison system, ensuring that inmates receive notice and an
opportunity to be heard in connection with allegations of miscon-
duct may ease some of the tension between inmates and prison
officials. Individuals do not lose their constitutional rights at the
prison door. Where circumstances allow, procedural protections
are a vital means of protecting the inmate's residuum of liberty. As
a rehabilitative tool, procedural due process can help foster respect
for the system and thereby aid in reassimilating the inmate into
society.
The Supreme Court's decision in Sandin v. Conner, however,
retreats from these basic principles in favor of preserving judicial
resources and reassigning to the states control over their own
prisons systems. The legal barrier established in Sandin effectively
prevents procedural due process claims based on state law. Lower
courts will likely struggle with prisoner claims as they attempt to
interpret the meaning of Sandin's "atypical and significant"
deprivation standard. Ironically, the Majority opinion in Sandin
may create the very litigation that the majority's reasoning had
sought to avoid.
Assessing the process due in the context of inner-prison
disciplinary proceedings involves a myriad of competing concerns.
While inmates struggle to protect what little liberty they retain, the
state uses its authority to promote rehabilitation and to quell
violence. While Sandin may ultimately prompt promulgation of
rules to guide prison officials in the daily administration of state
prisons, it simultaneously strips inmates of the right to enforce
these rules. Although the full impact of Sandin is yet unknown, the
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decision appears to be a serious set-back to prisoners asserting their
constitutional rights.
Julia M. Glencer

